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I. INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into
force on January 1, 1994.1 Its Eleventh Chapter establishes
substantive guarantees 2 and an arbitral mechanism by which
qualifying investors may seek damages for breach of those
arbitration
investor-state
The
much-discussed
guarantees.
apparatus 3 was first invoked in September 1996, 4 and since then has

1.
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art.
2203, 32 I.L.M. 605, 702 [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA was brought into U.S. law by
the NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (codified in 19
U.S.C. 3301-3473 (1993)).
2.
Contained in Section A of Chapter 11, the substantive protections conferred
resemble those found in modern Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). NAFTA, supra
note 1, arts. 1101-14. Among these guarantees are national and most favored nation
treatments, id. arts. 1102-03, observance of the international minimum standardincluding fair and equitable treatment, id. art. 1105, and full compensation in the
event of expropriation, id. art. 1110.
3.
The literature has grown appreciably as a result of Chapter 11. See
Bibliographyof Selected Works on Chapter 11, 17(1) NEWS & NOTES INST. TRANSNAT'L
ARB. 6 (Winter 2003) [hereinafter ITA Bibliography]. For general treatments of
Chapter l's dispute resolution regime, see generally Henri Alvarez, Arbitration Under
the North American Free Trade Agreement, 16 ARB. INT'L 393 (2000); David A. Ganz,
Resolution of Investment Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 10
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 335 (1993); Horacio G. Na6n, The Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Private Parties, 1(1) J. WORLD INVEST. 59 (2000); Robert
Paterson, A New Pandora's Box? Private Remedies for Foreign Investors Under the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DiSp. RESOL. 77
(2000); Clyde C. Pearce & Jack Coe, Jr., Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven:
Some Pragmatic Reflections Upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico, 23 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 311 (2000); Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA
Investment Chapter: Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L
LAW. 727 (1993); Daniel M. Price, Some Observations on ChapterEleven of NAFTA, 23
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 421 (2000).
4.
The proceeding was Ethyl v. Canada, which ended in settlement after
the tribunal's unanimous award on jurisdiction rejected Canada's petition for
dismissal. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, June 24, 1998, 38 I.L.M.
708, 724-30 (1999). Ethyl, Inc. was a Virginia Corporation that manufactured and
distributed methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MMT), a fuel additive.
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been resorted to several times against each NAFTA state. Many cases
have concluded, while others are nearing completion. 5 Though a
mature jurisprudence has by no means emerged, substantive trends
distinctive
have been established and several of Chapter l's
features, strengths, and weaknesses have been illuminated.
NAFTA's investor-state docket has generated predictably high
levels of interest among international law scholars and practitioners.
It has also sustained a remarkable collection of observers beyond
specialist circles. Numerous critiques have issued from both groups,
and reactions to NAFTA have prefigured much of the debate that will
ensue in relation to its more ambitious proposed successor, the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).6 In assessing Chapter l's
dispute regime, it is difficult to fully divorce substance from
procedure. Accordingly, while the following interim appraisal of
Chapter 11 is concerned primarily with the investor-state arbitration
regime, that framework's impact on the substantive jurisprudence of
NAFTA will also be treated, albeit not comprehensively.
Part II surveys elements of architecture and develops certain
themes. Part III identifies emerging docket patterns. Part IV
considers processes and sources that influence the formation of
Chapter 11 jurisprudence. Part V discusses selected conceptions and
misgivings that have recurred concerning Chapter 11. Part VI
considers the mechanisms intended to exert control on Chapter 11
awards and introduces proposals for refining the associated
framework. In general, this essay concludes that the existing

Its wholly owned Ontario company operated fuel blending and processing facilities
in Ontario. Id. at 709. In 1995, a bill to ban import and interprovincial distribution
of MMT was introduced in Parliament. Id. at 710. Before the measure became law,
which it eventually did, the claimant had both issued its Article 1119 Intent to
Claim and the claim itself. Id. at 728; see infra note 54 and accompanying text.
The claim alleged breaches of Articles 1102 (national treatment), 1106
(performance requirements), and 1110 (expropriation). Ethyl Corp., Award on
Jurisdiction, supra, at 711. Canada's unsuccessful jurisdictional challenges relied
in large measure on the claimant's premature initiation of arbitration. Having not
prevailed on jurisdiction, Canada settled before an award on the merits was
issued, paying Ethyl $13 million. See Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes
Under NAFTA: A Tale of Fear and Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 43, 47-48 n.32,
57-59 (2001). See generally Alan C. Swan, Ethyl Corporation v. Canada, Award on
Jurisdiction (Under NAFTA/UNCITRAL) 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 159 (2000) (arguing
that the Ethyl tribunal's decision reflected an interpretive methodology for future
NAFTA arbitrations); Todd Weiler, The Ethyl Arbitration: First of Its Kind and
Harbinger of Things to Come, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 187 (2000) (discussing the
experience of the Ethyl tribunal).
5.
At the end of 2002, there were roughly 16 pending cases, distributed among
the three respondent states. See generally http://www.naftalaw.org (comprehensive
website collecting most essential Chapter 11 docket-related materials).
6.
See generally FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS, available at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/alca-e.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
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arrangement is neither fundamentally flawed nor entirely free of
troubling features.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF NAFTA's INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRAL MECHANISM:
SOME BROAD THEMES

A. Claim ProcessingArchitecture:A Patchwork of Old and New
1. In General
Section B of Chapter 11 sets forth with specificity rules
conditioning an investor's resort to arbitration, the character and
mandate of the arbitral tribunals that are to serve, and numerous
related matters. 7 It also relies upon several generally well-tested
texts and regimes, including three rules formulae and three arbitral
conventions. These texts perform their ordinary function subject to
the specific ways of proceeding agreed by the NAFTA states and set
forth in Section B. Domestic arbitration statutes too play a role,
though as a practical matter their role is largely restricted to the
8
post-award setting.
Private lawsuits in one NAFTA state against other NAFTA
states have been explicitly foreclosed by NAFTA and associated
statutes of implementation.9 Nevertheless, some flexibility is afforded
claimants under the arbitral remedy to which they are confined in the
form of a choice of formats. Section B contemplates that in many

7.
NAFTA's arbitral regime is established in Section B of Chapter 11. NAFTA,
supra note 1, arts. 1115-38. Section A contains substantive investor protections. Id.
arts. 1101-14. Section C contains definitions bearing on Sections A and B. Id. art.
1139.
8.
Under the present ratification patterns, the ICSID Convention (with its
internal annulment procedure) does not apply to Chapter 11 disputes. Consequently,
attacks on Chapter 11 awards occur in the courts of the place of arbitration, which
apply local grounds for vacatur. Three such set-aside actions have been instituted, two
by Mexico, one by Canada-all in Canadian courts. Similarly, since ICSID Convention
arbitration cannot yet be elected, global enforcement of Chapter 11 awards depends
primarily on the New York Convention, in the manner of ordinary commercial awards.

See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr., Domestic Court Control of Investment Awards: Necessary
Evil or Achilles Heel Within NAFTA and the Proposed FTAA?, 19(3) J. INT'L ARB. 185
(2002) (arguing that the current Chapter 11 mechanism hinders efficiency through its
lack of centralization).
9.
Article 2021 of the NAFTA states that "[n]o Party may provide for a right
of action under its domestic law against any other Party on the ground that a measure
of another Party is inconsistent with this Agreement." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2021.
The United States and Canada have codified Article 2021. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 3312(c)
(West 2003); North American Free Trade Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, cl. 44, § 6(2)
(Can.). See also J. Christopher Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 433, 450 (2002) [hereinafter Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower]
(discussing Canadian law related to the § 6(2) limitation).
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instances the aggrieved investor may designate either UNCITRAL
Rules of arbitration or one of two ICSID' 0 formats1 1 (the type and
availability depending on the ICSID Convention status of the states
involved). However, the present range of options is not as diverse as
one might imagine. Because neither Mexico nor Canada is yet a
member of the ICSID Convention, 12 only the alternative of ICSID's
Additional Facility has been available and then only in the common
circumstance in which the United States is either the claimant's state
3
of nationality or is the respondent.'
2. Section B: The Basic Sequence and Departures Therefrom
The procedures detailed in Section B of Chapter 11, though
somewhat intricate, contemplate a scenario in which notice and
cooling-off periods induce more deliberate claims than might
otherwise occur. An uncontroversial marshaling of a claim would
unfold as follows: upon ascertaining that an apparent breach of
Chapter 11 by its NAFTA Party host had injured its investment, the
investor (a national of another NAFTA state) would pursue redress
through consultation with host state officials 14 and, upon the failure

10.
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
[hereinafter ICSID]. ICSID is a creature of treaty. See Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
11.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1120.
12.
In addition to establishing ICSID, see supra note 10, the ICSID Convention
sets forth a detailed arbitral regime designed, in conjunction with the ICSID's
arbitration rule formulae, to operate independently of national legal systems. See
generally Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES COURS (HAGUE
ACADEMY OF INT'L L.) 330 (1972) (discussing the history of the ICSID Convention).
13.
That is, strictly speaking no ICSID format exists to accommodate
investment disputes where neither state implicated is an ICSID Convention party. The
restriction means that, at present, Canadian and Mexican investors are limited to
UNCITRAL arbitration where, respectively, Mexico or Canada are the respondent
states. See Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, art. 2, at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/ ICSID_-Addl-English.pdf [hereinafter Additional Facility Rules]. There are
indications that ICSID is prepared to help administer NAFTA arbitrations under the
UNCITRAL Rules, which would mitigate the effects of limited treaty membership.
When another NAFTA state ratifies the ICSID Convention, the Chapter 11 docket will
become potentially more diverse; proceedings under three regimes-the two ICSID
offerings and UNCITRAL Rules arbitration-will be possible. There will, in that case,
invariably be a choice of regimes. Assuming, for example, that Canada ratifies the
Convention, a Canadian investor seeking arbitration with the United States may
designate either UNCITRAL Rules or ICSID arbitration (just as a U.S. investor could
against Canada). A Mexican investor bringing claims against the United States or
Canada, by contrast, would be able to proceed under ICSID's Additional Facility, or
under the UNCITRAL Rules, but not under the Convention (assuming Mexico
remained a non-ICSID Convention Party).
14.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1118.

1388

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36.1381

of such efforts, would notify the host state of its intention to bring a
Chapter 11 claim (Notice of Intent or Notice).' 5 The notice would
contain specified information (including the provisions alleged to
have been breached and the factual basis for the claim). 16 Thereafter,
the arbitral claim could be filed, subject to three timing restraints.
First, it would be submitted not sooner than 90 days from the date
upon which the notice of intent 17 was delivered and, second, not
sooner than six months after the occurrences prompting the claim. 18
Third, irrespective of when the notice was given, the-claim would not
be filed later than 3 years from the date when the investor should
have discovered the breach and injury. 19
The claim would be filed in the manner set forth in the arbitral
rules corresponding to the investor's choice of format (UNCITRAL or
the applicable ICSID regime), 20 and would be accompanied by a
written waiver and consent to arbitration. 21 The waiver would
relinquish the investor's right "to initiate or continue" certain
domestic proceedings "with respect to the measure ... alleged to be a
breach of [Chapter 11]."22
Despite the prosaic nature of the foregoing claim marshalling
procedure, jurisdiction-related skirmishes have become commonplace,
in part because claimants have deviated from the prescribed ordering
and content set forth above. What should be the consequence of
premature initiation of the process? 2 3 Is the waiver an element of
jurisdiction or largely a formality?24 These and numerous other
questions of this type have regularly occupied tribunals as
preliminary matters, a characteristic of Chapter 11 arbitration more
fully discussed under Subsection C below.

15.
Id. art. 1119.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. art. 1120.
19.
Id. arts. 1116-17.
20.
See supra note 13.
21.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121(3).
22.
The waiver requirement applies to damage suits. Excepted therefore from
the waiver requirement are "proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other
extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages, before an administrative
tribunal or court under the law of the disputing Party." Id. art. 112 1(1)(b).
23.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24.
See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
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B. Chapter 11 Arbitration:A Hybrid
1. Public and Private Features
Arbitration between states and private parties--"mixed"
arbitration--of the kind sponsored by Chapter 11 has characteristics
of inter-state arbitration 25 and of private international commercial
arbitration. 26 The similarities to the latter are readily apparent. Once
underway, Chapter 11 arbitration follows the familiar pattern,
ordinarily progressing through written and oral phases culminating
in deliberations and the issuance of a written, reasoned award.
Typically, three-arbitrator tribunals are formed by each party
appointing one arbitrator; the disputants themselves (and not the
party-appointed arbitrators) collaborate to designate the presiding
arbitrator. 2 7 All arbitrators are expected to be independent.
As in standard contract-based arbitration, the tribunal enjoys
wide discretion in the pursuit, admission, and weighing of evidence as
well as appreciable latitude in the conduct of the proceedings in
general. 28 In at least one critical respect, Chapter 11 arbitrators have
been called upon to exercise their discretion with greater regularity
than occurs, in private international arbitration-in designating the
place of arbitration. ("place" in the juridical sense of arbitral seat). At
present, like its private cousin, Chapter 11, arbitration attributes to
the seat jurisdictional and applicable law consequences, particularly
if an award is attacked. 29 No meaningful pre-dispute opportunity
typically arises for the disputants to fix the details of a future
Chapter 11 arbitration; nor would there be much incentive to pursue
one given that neither side expects to arbitrate. After dispute arises,
of course, and the claim has been filed, the disputants do not readily
agree on the place of arbitration for obvious reasons. Accordingly,
30
tribunals, almost always, have designated the place.

25.
NAFTA Chapter 20 contemplates inter-state arbitration and sets forth a
corresponding regime. See David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute
Resolution Under NAFTA's Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 481, 488-510 (2000) (discussing the Chapter 20 arbitration mechanism and
the Model Rules of Procedure).
26.
For similar reflections upon the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, see David
Caron, The Nature of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of
InternationalDispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 104, 154-55 (1990).
27.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1123.
28.
See generally JACK J. COE, JR., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT chs. 9-10 (1997).

29.
See infra notes 286-302 and accompanying text.
30.
NAFTA Article 1130 provides that, subject to the contrary agreement of the
disputing parties, the place of arbitration is to be in the territory of a NAFTA state that
is also a New York Convention state, selected in accordance with whichever rule
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Chapter 1I's variations from its private counterpart arise because one
disputant is always a state3 l and because of system features designed
to both confer limited private standing for obligations ordinarily
subsisting only on the international plane 32 and to anticipate the
resulting train of mixed arbitrations. Among Section B's defining
characteristics are the sources consulted for rules of decision (the
treaty text and rules of public international law) 33 and the associated
34
jurisprudential methods.

formulation governs. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1130. Under all potentially applicable
rules, the tribunal may designate the place of arbitration when the parties fail to do so.
Under the Additional Facility Rules, the tribunal is to consult with the parties before
fixing a place. Additional Facility Rules, supra note 13, art. 20(1). Under article 16(1) of
the UNCITRAL Rules, the tribunal is to have "regard to the circumstances of the
arbitration." U.N. Commission on InternationalTrade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration
Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 31st Sess., Supp.
No. 17, ch. V, § C, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976). With respect to designations of the place of
arbitration, it has become common for tribunals, after hearing the parties, to weigh,
with some variations, the factors listed in the UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing
Arbitral Proceedings. See Report of the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law,
(A/51/17), XXVII Y.B. of UNCITRAL
11-54. Neutrality is not a NAFTA-mandated
factor in the designation process, though in Metalclad-an Additional Facility
proceeding between an American claimant and Mexico-the tribunal, citing neutrality
considerations, selected Vancouver, British Columbia. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Final
Award, Aug. 30, 2000, at www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ awards.htm. See also Ethyl
Corp. v. Canada, Award on Place of Arbitration, Nov. 28, 1997, at
http://www.naftalaw.org (tribunal considered UNCITRAL Notes'
22 factors and
neutrality in deciding upon Toronto).
31.
See, e.g., Georges R. Delaume, Sovereign Immunity and Transnational
Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 313, 313

(Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1986) ("[tlhe presence of a state as a party to arbitral proceedings
gives a particular colouration to the arbitral process [manifest in] . . . a number of
original issues"). See generally COE, supra note 28, ch. 13. Questions and topics
regularly arise in Chapter 11 that would not likely be involved in a commercial
arbitration not involving a state. To mention but a few: which acts with arguably
private elements can be attributed to a state for assessing responsibility? See generally
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, June 26, 2003, at
http://www.naftalaw.org; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on
Jurisdiction, Jan. 5, 2001,
32-74, at http://www.naftalaw.org. Should the
instrument conferring competency on Chapter 11 tribunals be construed so as to defer
to sovereignty? See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, June 24, 1998, 38
I.L.M. 708 (1999); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Final Award on the Merits, Nov. 13,
2000, at http://www.naftalaw.org. Must a Chapter 11 claimant exhaust local remedies?
See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text. What is the scope and effect of Crown
Privilege and who decides those questions? Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on Crown
Privilege and Solicitor-Client Privilege, Sept. 6, 2000, at http://www.naftalaw.org.
What inferences if any should a tribunal draw from the government's perfunctory
destruction of materials later sought as evidence? Cf. Feldman v. Mexico, Final Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Dec. 16, 2002,
6 at http://www.naftalaw.org
(addressing ministry destruction of documents every five years); see also id.
123,
132, 167, 174-78 (discussing problems created by incomplete information).
32.
See infra notes 82-87, 157-58 and accompanying text.
33.
The investment-related obligations assumed by NAFTA states are a blend
of treaty standards and customary rules incorporated expressly or implicitly by
reference. Thus, in NAFTA Article 1110, references to "expropriation" implicate a body
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More distinctive than the applicable law is the role played by
non-disputant stake-holders in identifying the content of the
obligations in question. In particular, the treaty text-a tribunal's
first stop in identifying controlling principles-is subject to formal
interpretations issued jointly by the parties (as more fully discussed
below) 35 and to the influence the two non-disputant NAFTA states
may exert individually through their Article 1128 submissions. 36 On
occasion, though not expressly contemplated in the NAFTA, amici
37
have also been allowed to contribute views.
2. Relative Complexity
Compared to investment treaties in general, Chapter 11 is
relatively complex. A crude but descriptive portrayal of Chapter 11 is
that it is a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) inserted into a multilateral free trade agreement. While Chapter l's similarity to recent
U.S. and Mexican BITs is apparent, it is more involved than most
bilateral instruments. Its embedding in a multi-chapter text that
addresses a range of activities in addition to investment engenders

of customary doctrine addressing what constitutes a compensable taking and whether
the conditions for lawfulness of that taking have been met. NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
1110. Concurrently, the same article confirms standards that might otherwise be
disputed, such as that full, prompt compensation (not just 'appropriate' compensation
must be paid), that lawfulness depends on a public purpose, and that
nondiscrimination is required. Id. Sometimes the incorporation of international law is
explicit, such as in Article 1105 which requires "treatment in accordance with
international law," a reference to a customary minimum standard that regulates host
state behavior in relation to nationals of other states and their property. Id. art. 1105.
34.
For example, Chapter 11 tribunals apply standard rules of treaty
interpretation, which among other principles take account of a treaty's objects and
purposes. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, June 24, 1998, 38 I.L.M.
708, 723-24 (1999) (relying on principles found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties).
35.
See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
36.
The two non-disputant NAFTA Parties are entitled to make submissions on
points of interpretation, and to be provided with the evidence and argument adduced
by the disputants. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1128-29. In a given case the claimant
may perceive that it has three opponents, though it is not true that the positions taken
by the two non-disputant states invariably are the same as, or even favorable to, those
of the respondent. See Pearce & Coe, supranote 3, at 319-20.
37.
In Methanex, the tribunal determined that it would accept written amicus
submissions of a limited nature from certain organizations wishing to express, in
particular, views related to environmental protection. See Methanex v. United States,
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae,"
Jan. 15, 2001, 11 47-53, at http://www.naftalaw.org. The United Parcel Service v.
Canada tribunal, in principle, also authorized limited, written amici submissions,
subject to strictures to be established in consultation with the disputants. See United
Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for
Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, Oct. 17, 2001, 1 73, at
http://www.naftalaw.org.
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questions of coverage and hierarchy and broadens the context in
which Chapter 11's proper meaning is to be deduced. For the
conditions under which a tax measure might be compensable, for
example, one looks also to Chapter 21.38 The acts of monopolies and
state enterprises might be actionable under Chapter 11, but only
under parameters outlined in Chapter 15.39 And the application of
most of Chapter 11's central guarantees is qualified by exemptions
and reservations detailed in several Annexes and associated
40
schedules.
3. Intersections with Domestic Arbitral Regimes
The interplay between Section B and domestic arbitral regimes
has occasionally produced interesting questions, many not purely

academic. In Metalclad,4 1 for instance, when the award was
attacked, 4 2 two potentially applicable arbitration statutes competed
for application; the outcome depended upon whether Chapter 11
awards are "commercial" within the meaning of British Columbia's
International Commercial Arbitration Act (ICA). Justice Tysoe ruled
that they are and thus fall under the ICA, an important
determination since the default was to a statute that (unlike the ICA)
43
allowed review for errors of law.

38.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2103(6).
39.
Id. arts. 1502(3)(a), 1503(2).
40.
See, e.g., ADF Group Inc. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB (AF)/00/1, Jan. 9, 2003, at http://www.naftalaw.org. In ADF a Canadian supplier
of processed steel wished to participate in a state highway project. Its business plan
was frustrated by federal "buy American" regulations-implemented through the state
of Virginia-which required that the claimant fabricate in the United States the steel
to be supplied for the project. The tenability of the claim depended in part on the
applicability of NAFTA Article 1108(7) which exempts "procurement by a Party" from
Chapter 1l's guarantees of national and most favored nation treatment and from its
restrictions on performance requirements. The specific question was whether
procurement by the Commonwealth of Virginia constituted "procurement by a Party."
The tribunal ruled that it did, so that the exemption reached Virginia's policies. Id.
199.
41.
See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/97/1, Aug. 30, 2000, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
Metalclad was the first Chapter 11 claim filed against Mexico and the first proceeding
initiated under the Additional Facility Rules. See generally Pearce & Coe, supra note 3.
42.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text; infra notes 286-302 and
accompanying text (discussing attacks on Chapter 11 awards in domestic courts).
43.
United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., Reasons for Judgment of the
Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, May 2, 2001,
44, 49 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001), at
http://www.naftalaw.org. For insights as to the pleading and strategic intricacies
affecting the two alternatives from Mexico's vantage point, see Thomas, A Reply to
Professor Brower, supra note 9, at 441-42. Arbitral tribunals considering a similar
question under the FAA for purposes of selecting from among potential seats have
found it unnecessary to reach a result, as the competing cities could be said to be
served by comparable arbitration laws regardless of the FAA's applicability. See Jack J.
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Institutional policies and statutory prerogatives may also come
into tension, as illustrated again by the Metalclad litigation. The trial
court authorized remission of the award. Chapter 11 does not address
remission. The ICSID Additional Facility Rules contemplate limited
post-award resort to the tribunal but similarly do not speak directly
to remission. ICSID's Secretariat questioned whether remission
would be proper. 44 The ICA, however, gives the court the option to
remit, rather than vacate. 4 5 Because the parties settled before the
question of remission could be fully considered by ICSID and the
British Columbia trial court, the role of remission remains subject to
46
speculation.
C. The Preeminence of Jurisdiction-RelatedIssues
1. In General
In international commercial arbitration, consent to arbitrate and
hence the arbitrators' mandate is typically contained in a clause
embedded in a main contract. Ordinarily, the mutual commitment to
arbitrate is forged before dispute arises and implicates only those in
contractual privity. By contrast, Chapter 11 contains the NAFTA
states' continuing offer to a class of potential claimants to arbitrate
claims fitting within subject matter and temporal parameters
enunciated in NAFTA's text. In pressing a claim, the investor in a
4 7
sense accepts the host state's offer, and hence its terms.

Coe, Jr., The Serviceable Texts of International Commercial Arbitration: An
Embarrassment of Riches, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. DISP. RESOL. 143, 153 n.46
(2002).
44.
Correspondence on file with the author. See also United Mexican States v.
Metalclad Corp., Supplementary Reasons for Judgment of the Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe
Oct. 31, 2001, (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001) at http://www.naftalaw.org (holding that remission
to the tribunal was inappropriate).
45.
See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Metalclad-A Retrospective, NAFTA ARB. REP. 65, 7980 (2002). As to the thinking behind the Model Law's remission provision, see HOWARD
M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 920-22 (1989).

46.
As a remedial option given to the trial court under the lex arbitri,the power
to remit presumably would be unaffected by arbitral rules that neither authorize nor
expressly prohibit remission. An opposite conclusion would follow if the proceeding
were governed by the ICSID Convention; in that circumstance, remission would not be
proper because the autonomous control regime established by the Convention is
exclusive.
47,
See generally Andrea Bjorklund, NAFTA Chapter 11: Contract Without
Privity: Sovereign Offer and Investor Acceptance, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 183 (2001) (arguing
that Chapter 11 is best understood as "arbitration without privity"); Jan Paulsson,
Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232 (1995) (arguing that arbitration
without privity fills a void in the international legal process).
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Most Chapter 11 arbitrations have involved jurisdictional
contests instigated by respondent states relying upon the limitations
and qualifications said by them to condition their offer to arbitrate.
Chapter 11 is unique within NAFTA's multi-chapter network of
trilateral undertakings, which extends well beyond questions of
investor protections. While private entities are the intended
beneficiaries of many of NAFTA's protections, it is only breaches of
Chapter 11 that may be redressed through private arbitral claims.
Thus, just as a contract may designate only certain of its provisions
as arbitrable, leaving the remainder for other forms of dispute
resolution, so has NAFTA limited private arbitral standing to
Chapter 11.48
2. Terms of Art as Jurisdictional Gatekeepers
Chapter 11 tribunals are empowered to decide jurisdictional
questions in the first instance and in doing so are bound by the scope
and character of the consent establishing their competency. The types
of jurisdictional limitation classically associated with tribunalstemporal, subject matter related, and personal-are apparent in
Chapter 11, which sets forth expressly or by implication numerous
prerequisites to a viable arbitration. Limitations ratione temporis
would include the rule that to be actionable a breach of NAFTA's
undertakings must have occurred not earlier than January 1, 1994,
NAFTA's effective date. 49 Subject-matter strictures (jurisdiction

48.
The relationship between Chapter 11 and other chapters is to some extent
moderated by express provision. Under Article 1112(1), if there arises an inconsistency
between Chapter 11 and another chapter, the other chapter prevails "to the extent of
the inconsistency." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1112(1); cf. id., art. 1114(1) (providing
that parties may take appropriate measures with respect to investment activity to
protect the environment, subject to the remaining provisions of Chapter 11).
49.
NAFTA applies to investments existing on January 1, 1994. Id. arts.
1502(3)(a), 1503(2). The rule that alleged breaches occurring before that date are not
actionable comports with the presumption that treaties are not ordinarily retroactive.
See Mondev v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, Oct. 11,
2002,
60- 61, 73, at http://www.naftalaw.org; see also Feldman v. Mexico, Final
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Dec. 16, 2002, 51 at http://www.naftalaw.org
(accord, reiterating the tribunal's decision of December 6, 2000). The Mondev tribunal
disallowed certain of claimant's theories of recovery including an expropriation claim
that in the tribunal's view became actionable no later than during 1991. It also limited
the extent to which a continuing breach might fall within a tribunal's jurisdiction; a
post-1993 refusal to compensate an investor for a pre-NAFTA breach would not be
enough. Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, 1 70 ("[tlhe mere fact that earlier
conduct has gone unremedied ... when a treaty enters into force does not justify a
tribunal applying the treaty retrospectively to that conduct").
The post-1993 breach rule is to be distinguished from the 3-year time bar of
Articles 1116 and 1117. The period begins to run when investor should have become
aware of the NAFTA breach and its injury. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1116(2),
1117(2). The time when the breach is deemed to occur is a mixed-law and factquestion. Though, as demonstrated in Mondev a claim may run afoul of both
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ratione materiae), confine actions essentially to those arising out of
"measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to .
investments . . . in the territory of the Party."50 Proper persons
(jurisdiction ratione personae), consist in the claimant being a
national of a NAFTA Party other than the respondent NAFTA state.
The surgical approach of states in pressing limits on the types of
claims that may be brought has ensured that no subsidiary element
to be divined from the text goes unnoticed. Chapter 11 submissions
and awards bristle with hard fought battles over the meaning of
"measure," "adopted and maintained," "by a Party,"5 1 "relating to,"5 2
"an investment," and "an investor of a Party. ' 53 Seemingly clerical

requirements, the same date may not govern the two analyses. In theory there could
occur a pre-NAFTA breach reasonably not discovered until after NAFTA came into
effect. For purposes of the non-retroactivity rule, presumably the date of breach-not
the date of discovery-would control and the claim would fail.
50.
Id. art. 1101.
51.
For example, are the acts of local governments capable of being "measures" of a
"Party"? The issue was broached by Mexico in Metalclad,in part because NAFTA's "Extent
of Obligations" provision, id. art. 105, only expressly requires the parties to achieve
observance '"by state and provincial governments." The question was not academic; a
municipality's conduct was central to the claim. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Final Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Aug. 30, 2000, at http://www.worldbank.org
icsid/caseslawards.htm. Consistent with the third-party (Article 1128) submissions of the
United States, the tribunal construed NAFTA to extend to local government measures.
Id. %73. The Loewen tribunal also reached an affirmative answer in relation to the acts of
courts in administering private lawsuits. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States,
Decision on Jurisdiction, Jan. 5, 2001, 77 45-47, at http://www.naftalaw.org.
52.
The Methanex case resulted in a watershed construction of "measures ...
relating to: (a) investors .. .[and] (b) investments." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1101(1).
The claimant, a Canadian entity, produced methanol, an ingredient in the gasoline
additive MTBE, which California lawmakers determined to exclude from gasoline. The
tribunal attributed to Article 1101 jurisdictional import, requiring it to determine
whether the measures complained of "related to" Methanex's investment. The question
arose because neither measure was overtly aimed at methanol, methanol producers in
general, or Methanex in particular. The tribunal ruled that merely being affected by a
measure was not sufficient. Accordingly, as pleaded, Methanex's claim did not satisfy
Article 1101(1)'s predicate that the measure prompting the claim be "related to" an
investment of an investor. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Preliminary Award on
Jurisdiction, Aug. 7, 2002, If 128, at http://www.naftalaw.org. Methanex was allowed to
refashion its pleadings to demonstrate government conduct more specifically targeting
it.
53.
See, e.g., Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, June 26, 2003,
at http://www.naftalaw.org. Loewen involved two claimants (one corporate, one
individual), alleging injuries to two corporations (a Canadian corporation and its
American subsidiary). The individual investor, Raymond Loewen, claimed under
Article 1117, characterizing himself as an "investor of a Party" entitled, by control or
ownership, to bring an action on behalf of the Canadian entity. That entity in turn
brought a claim on its own behalf, and on behalf of its American subsidiary. Id. %771, 9.
After the claim was filed, the Canadian entity was reorganized, emerging as an
American company. Id. 7 220. That left, in the tribunal's view, no Canadian entity
capable of pursuing the claim, despite the assignment of the NAFTA action to a
Canadian corporation (apparently formed for that sole purpose). Id. 917 220, 237. With
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elements in the claims processing protocol have also been invoked by

respondent states, sometimes with surprising success. In at least two
have had to consider defects
cases, for example, Chapter 11 tribunals
54
in the waiver required by Article 1121.

respect to the corporate claim, the diversity of nationality required for a proper
Chapter 11 claim, though satisfied when the claim was initiated, had not-because of
the reorganization-been observed for the entire pendency of the arbitration. In the
tribunal's view, the real party in interest had become an American entity, thus
breaking the continuity of nationality. Id. 11 231-40. As a jurisdictional matter, the
position became as if an American entity had brought a Chapter 11 claim against the
United States. Id. $ 225. The individual claim ultimately failed because Mr. Loewen
did not demonstrate his ownership in the Canadian entity on whose behalf he
purported to claim. Id. 1 239. As to the merits, see notes 83, 188-202 and
accompanying text.
Article 1121, under the heading "Conditions Precedent to Submission of a
54.
Claim to Arbitration" requires claimants, in writing, "to waive their right to initiate or
continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or
other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of
the disputing Party that is alleged to be a [Chapter 11] breach[.]" NAFTA, supra note
1, art. 1121(2)(b).
The waiver is to be "included in the submission of a claim to arbitration." Id. art.
1121(3). A submission is deemed under the UNCITRAL Rules to occur when notice of
arbitration is given. In Ethyl, the investor was arguably late by tendering its Article
1121 waiver with its statement of claim, rather than with its UNCITRAL Rules Notice
of Arbitration. See Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, June 24, 1998, 38
I.L.M. 708, 729 (1999). (Canada argued that jurisdiction was absent due to Ethyl's
failure to submit its Article 1121 waiver with its 1121 waiver with its Notice of
Arbitration). As with that investor's precipitous handling of the Notice of Intent and
claim, the tribunal would not dismiss the claim on the basis of the timing of the
submission. Id.
An ostensibly more rigorous approach to the waiver requirement was applied in the
first Waste Management proceeding, in which flaws in the waiver led to dismissal of the
claim. See Waste Management v. Mexico, Award, June 2, 2000, at http://naftalaw.org.
In anticipation of pressing certain domestic actions, the claimant added to its waiver
an interpretive rider, stating in one of its iterations:
Without derogating from the waiver required by NAFTA Article 1121,
Claimants here set forth their understanding that the above waiver does not
apply to any dispute settlement proceedings involving allegations that
Respondent has violated duties imposed by sources of law other than Chapter
Eleven of NAFTA, including the municipal law of Mexico.

Id. § 5.
The rider's focus on "sources" was not fully responsive to Article 1121's reference to
"measure" (not sources) in identifying the sphere of activities to be waived. For a
majority of the Waste Management I tribunal, it was not sufficient that "no NAFTArelated breach of international law" had been alleged in the domestic proceedings. Id.
§ 6. By the claimant's own admission, at least one of the measures complained of was
common to the domestic and Chapter 11 proceedings. The form and timing of the
waiver, though required to be proper, had to also be matched by conduct consistent
with the waiver's undertakings. Id. §§ 27-31. See generally William Dodge,
International Decision: Waste Management v. Mexico, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 186 (2001).
The case was resubmitted before a new tribunal, and is pending. See generally Eduardo
T. Siqueiros, NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitration: Recent Developments, 17(1) NEWS &
NOTES INST. TRANSNAT'L ARB. 1 (Winter 2003).
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D. NAFTA Jurisprudence:Accessibility and Importance
The practice of publishing Chapter 11 awards gives NAFTA
jurisprudence an accessibility greater than that associated with
international commercial awards. To some extent, the ready
availability of Chapter 11 briefs, orders, and awards acknowledges
the potentially immense sphere of influence likely to be enjoyed by
such work-product. Well over 2000 BITs exist at present. Many of
them have marked similarities to each other and to Chapter 11,
giving Chapter 11 awards immediate relevance outside of the three
55
NAFTA countries.
NAFTA jurisprudence has a broader constituency than
commercial arbitration in another respect. Citizens of the three states
have a stake in the manner in which their governments behave
generally and in the way in which they mediate the sometimes
competing goals of promoting trade, protecting local enterprise, and
regulating on the public's behalf. NAFTA arbitration holds
government conduct up to scrutiny that it might not otherwise
receive. Concurrently, a given tribunal's power to influence the mix of
competing interests by attaching a penalty to governmental choices
56
has far-reaching implications.
Chapter 11 has also had tertiary influences on business culture,
apart from inducing enterprises to order corporate affairs to avail of
treaty advantages. Instances have occurred, for example, in which
Chapter 11 has been invoked for its in terrorem value. In Metalclad, a
kind of preemptive deployment was attempted by counsel for the
investor who supplied the Mexican government with the draft
Chapter 11 claim,5 7 hoping to effect a change of course.58 Similarly, in

55.
For example, a survey of approximately 550 of the more than 2000 BITs,
ranging from perhaps the oldest (signed Nov. 25, 1959) to among the very recent,
reveals that roughly 90 percent have fair and equitable treatment clauses. See ICSID
Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties, vols. 1-7 passim (1992); Charles H.
Brower II et al., Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's Investment Chapter,
Proceedings of the Ninety.Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of
InternationalLaw, 96 Am. SOC'Y INT'L PROC. 9, 19 (2002) (containing a textual analysis
of minimum standard clauses by Coe).
56.
See infra notes 268-80 and accompanying text.
57.
See generally Pearce & Coe, supra note 3 (additional supporting
correspondence on file with the author). Metalclad has generated extensive discussion,
and remains the only Chapter 11 proceeding in which the claimant received an award
under Article 1110 (expropriation). Metalclad, a U.S. corporation, acquired in 1993 a
Mexican company that held certain Mexican state and federal permits required to
construct and operate a hazardous waste landfill. See generally Coe, A Retrospective,
supra note 45; William S. Dodge, InternationalDecision: Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (2001); Todd Weiler, Metalclad v. Mexico: A Play in Three Parts,2 J.
WORLD INVEST. 685 (2001); Doubt remained at the time of acquisition whether the
project also needed a municipal construction permit. Relying on federal assurances
that it possessed all essential permits, Metalclad began construction, but was informed
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Ethyl the claimant filed its notice of intent to arbitrate while the
complained of measure was yet before Canadian lawmakers.5 9 There
was also a Mexican supermarket chain which, in anticipation of being
denied a certain permit in California, alerted the press 60 to an
imminent "reverse Metalclad" breach of Chapter 11, a reference to
Metalclad v. Mexico in which a certain permit figured prominently in
facts leading to recovery. 6 1 Because of the private standing conferred
under Chapter 11, there have also been attempts to style certain nonin an effort to avail of
Chapter 11 grievances as investment-related
62
an arbitral remedy otherwise not available.

by local officials that the project lacked a mandatory local construction permit. Those
officials ordered cessation of building activities; the company applied for the permit,
but on the advice of federal officials, openly continued construction. Metalclad, ICSID
Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, 7 88-92.
After a federal environmental audit of the project, the company and federal
authorities reached an accord (the Convenio) resolving issues raised by the audit and
establishing other details of the landfill's prospective operation. Id. 77$ 90-92. After
construction was substantially complete, soon after the Convenio was published, local
officials-after 13 months of inaction-declined the construction permit on grounds
that included certain environmental concerns. Id.
Company representatives had not been notified of or otherwise invited to the
meeting at which the application was disposed of. Soon thereafter, the municipality
initiated proceedings against the federal government attempting to block landfill
operations under the Convenio. Protracted court proceedings ensued during which an
injunction prohibited landfill operations. Several months after Metalclad's January
1997 claim had been filed, the Governor of the state in which the landfill was located
created a ecological reserve encompassing the landfill and surrounding areas; the
I 90-94, 109-11.
reserve's use limitations seemed to preclude landfill operations. Id. 77
The unanimous final award issued in August 2000 found an expropriation on two
different theories and a breach of fair and equitable treatment; it ordered Mexico to
pay Metalclad over $16 million (each disputant to bear its own costs). Mexico received
from a British Columbia court a judgment partially setting aside the award, resulting
in a downward adjustment in the amount of compensation owed. Rather than pursue
mutual appeals, Mexico and Metalclad settled. See Coe, supra note 43, at 153
(additional correspondence on file with the author); David Hechler, U.S. Firm Gets $16
Million in First NAFTA Claim, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A 17.
58.
In the investor's view, this practice was consistent with Article 1118's
suggestion that it consult and negotiate with Mexico before formally launching a claim.
59.
See Ethyl Corp., supra note 4, at 714.
The author was contacted for comment by the Orange County Register, and
60.
gathered this information by phone.
See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
61.
62.
The pivotal question often is whether the claimant in fact had an
"investment" within the meaning of Chapter 11. Investments do not include, for
example, "claims to money that arise solely from commercial contracts for the sale of
goods." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139.
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III. DOCKET CHARACTERISTICS

A. Subject Matter
The explicit focus of Chapter l's substantive guarantees is the
"measures" of one party relating to "investors" and "investments of
investors" of another party. 63 The treaty defines these terms
broadly 64 and, in general, tribunals have declined to give them a
restrictive scope. A wide variety of "measure" types have been the
basis of claims, including trade restrictions (import and export),
justice system practices (in particular alleged denials of justice by
state courts), concession cancellations, alterations in real property
rights, and permit-related facility closures. The substantive
provisions more often relied upon are those contained in Articles 1102
(national treatment), 65 1105 (minimum standard) 66 and 1110
(expropriation).6 7 That many of the measures complained of affect the
trans-boundary movement of goods and services-thus implicating
chapters other than 11-does not preclude its application where such
68
measures also "relate to" an investment.
B. DisputantPatterns
Though all of the NAFTA Parties have been respondents, certain
combinations have been more prevalent than others, presumably
owing in part to geographically influenced investment flows. 69 The
majority of claimants against the United States have been Canadian.
Most of the claims against Canada, in turn, have been brought by
U.S. investors, who are also on the other side of the bulk of actions
brought against Mexico. Actions by Mexican investors against the

63.
Id. art. 1101(1).
64.
Id. arts. 201, 1139.
65.
Id. art. 1102 (requiring NAFTA host states to accord treatment "no less
favorable than" that it confers upon its own nationals "in like circumstances").
Id. art. 1105 (requiring NAFTA host states to accord the investments of
66.
other NAFTA states' investors "treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security"). See infra
notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
67.
NAFTA, supra, note 1, art. 1110 (requiring, inter alia, that direct and
indirect expropriation of an investment be undertaken for a public purpose, without
discrimination, and with prompt compensation equating to the investment's fair
market value).
68.
See, e.g., S.D. Myers, inc. v. Canada, Final Award on the Merits, Nov. 13,
2000, at http:www.naftalaw.org (ban on exportation of hazardous waste).
69.
See infra tbl. 1.

1400

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 36:1381

other two parties have not been found among the published sources.
70
Similarly, Canadian claims against Mexico have not been reported.
C. Regime Selections and Arbitral Seats
In the approximately sixteen Chapter 11 claims that have
advanced beyond the notice of intent stage, claimants have
designated both available arbitral regimes several times, though the
71
Additional Facility has been the more frequently selected format.
Unlike the UNCITRAL Rules which, by 1994, had experienced
considerable use, the Additional Facility Rules were pressed into
service for the first time in early 1997.72 Published data demonstrate
that U.S. investors have since overwhelmingly selected the Additional
Facility when bringing claims against Mexico, but have preferred the
UNCITRAL Rules in arbitrations with Canada. 73 Canadian investors
have chosen the Additional Facility Rules most often when
arbitrating with the United States. These patterns no doubt reflect a
variety of factors, including the preferences of certain firms whose
services have been enlisted several times in Chapter 11 cases.
Washington D.C., Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver B.C.
have all been seats of Chapter 11 arbitration. 74 To the author's
knowledge, no Mexican city has yet been selected.
D. Settlement and Recoveries
The initiation of a Chapter 11 claim has rarely led to settlement.
Though several claims have been abandoned, perhaps only two-both
against Canada-have been resolved early in the process by the
aggrieved investor accepting an offer of compensation. 75 Claimants in
many Chapter 11 cases have alleged extensive damages. 76 The
amounts in controversy confirm the sense that Chapter l's dispute
mechanism attracts significant claims generally brought by

70.
However, the author has been informed that at least one such claim is in
preparation.
71.
See infra tbl. 1.
72.
Metalclad was the first claimant to designate the Additional Facility Rules,
followed soon thereafter by Azinian. See supranote 41.
73.
See infra tbl.1.
74.
As is common in international arbitration, hearings and other meetings in
furtherance of the proceedings sometimes occur away from the arbitral seat (place).
Metalclad was an extreme example of this practice; all arbitration hearings occurred at
ICSID's Washington D.C. facility, although the seat of arbitration was Vancouver, B.C.
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Aug. 30, 2000,
11, at http:www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
75.
One settlement occurred in Ethyl, summarized supra note 4. The other is
Trammel Crow v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration, Dec. 7,
2001 at http://naftalaw.org.
76.
See infra tbl. 4.
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enterprises with correspondingly adequate funding to contemplate a
vigorous, protracted campaign. The elite character of the process is
further illuminated when the chances of success are considered; the
docket to date makes plain that the probability of non-recovery, or
less-than expected recovery, is high, as vividly conveyed in table form
below. 77 Despite regular invocation of NAFTA's expropriation
provisions, only one award has found a compensable taking.78 Two
relatively small recoveries have been awarded against Canada under
Article 1105's fair and equitable treatment provision (totaling roughly
$5 million), 79 and another award (7.5 million pesos) has been levied
80
against Mexico for breach of its national treatment obligations.
Tribunals thus far have also exhibited a disinclination to award costs
of the proceeding, though8 1the costs of deciding a specific issue have
sometimes been awarded.

IV. THE

PROCESSES OF

NAFTA

JURISPRUDENCE

A. Tribunal Relationship to Domestic Courts
Virtually from the first award issued, NAFTA tribunals have
disavowed any appellate competency over domestic courts.8 2 The most
recent and elaborate enunciation came in Loewen, a case in which the
tribunal was highly critical of the state court proceeding that
engendered the claim. Despite condemning the state court
proceedings in question in the strongest of terms, the tribunal felt

77.
Id.
103-07. See supra note 57.
Metalclad, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1,
78.
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award in Respect of Damages, May 31, 2002, 41
79.
I.L.M. 1347, 1362, available at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
S.D. Myers v. Canada, Award on Damages, Oct. 21, 2002, available at
http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
80.
Feldman v. Mexico, Final Award, supra ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1,
Dec. 16, 2002, 205, at http://www.naftalaw.org.
Regarding awards of costs, see Mondev v. United States, Final Award,
81.
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)199/2, Oct.11, 2002, at http://www.naftalaw.org; Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award on Costs, Nov. 26, 2002, at http://www.naftalaw.org.
The factors considered in not disturbing each side's burden have included: the lack
of uniform NAFTA practice to the contrary, the complexity of the subject-matter, the
failure of either side to fully prevail, the mutual use of wasteful arguments and tactics,
the embryonic character of NAFTA jurisprudence, and the good faith and plausibility of
the losing party's claim. Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/9912, 159; Pope & Talbot,
8-10.
Award on Costs,
See, e.g., Azinian v. Mexico, Award, Nov. 1, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 537, 552,
82.
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm (last visited Sept. 12,
2003) (claimant not entitled to seek before arbitrators plenary review of national court
decisions under NAFTA; denial of justice or other international wrong must be
alleged).
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compelled to "stay its hand" in acknowledgment of the limited
83
mandate conferred upon Chapter 11 tribunals.
Additionally, domestic court rulings have often been given
appreciable deference by tribunals when announcing the content of
domestic law. This is not surprising given the relative expertise a
domestic court can be supposed to have in relation to local law.
Regardless, it is textbook doctrine that the two spheres are separate.
A failure to comply with domestic law does not necessarily imply a
breach of NAFTA.5 4 Nor does lawfulness of a measure under domestic
law control on the international plane8 5 and indeed, since the conduct

83.
Characteristic of the high literary value contained in certain Chapter 11
awards, the passage deserves extensive quotation. The tribunal wrote:
We think it right to add one final word. A reader following our account of the
injustices which were suffered by Loewen and Mr. Raymond Loewen in the
Courts of Mississippi could well be troubled to find that they emerge from the
present long and costly proceedings with no remedy at all. After all, we have
held that judicial wrongs may in principle be brought home to the State Party
under Chapter Eleven, and have criticised the Mississippi proceedings in the
strongest terms. There was an unfairness here towards the foreign investor.
Why not use the weapons at hand to put it right? What clearer case than the
present could there be for the ideals of NAFTA to be given some teeth?
This human reaction has been present in our minds throughout but we must
be on guard against allowing it to control our decision. Far from fulfilling the
purposes of NAFTA, an intervention on our part would compromise them by
obscuring the crucial separation between the international obligations of the
State under NAFTA, of which the fair treatment of foreign investors in the
judicial sphere is but one aspect, and the much broader domestic
responsibilities of every nation towards litigants of whatever origin who appear
before its national courts. Subject to explicit international agreement
permitting external control or review, these latter responsibilities are for each
individual state to regulate according to its own chosen appreciation of the ends
of justice. As we have sought to make clear, we find nothing in NAFIA to
justify the exercise by this Tribunal of an appellate function parallel to that
which belongs to the courts of the host nation. In the last resort, a failure by
that nation to provide adequate means of remedy may amount to an
international wrong but only in the last resort. The line may be hard to draw,
but it is real. Too great a readiness to step from outside into the domestic
arena, attributing the shape of an international wrong to what is really a local
error (however serious), will damage both the integrity of the domestic judicial
system and the viability of NAFTA itself. The natural instinct, when someone
observes a miscarriage of justice, is to step in and try to put it right, but the
interests of the international investing community demand that we must
observe the principles which we have been appointed to apply, and stay our
hands.
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, June 26, 2003, l 241-42, at
http://www.naftalaw.org (paragraph numbering omitted).
84.
Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, 1 78.
85.
Id. T 98. See generally Eileen Denza, The Relationship Between
Internationaland National Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW Ch. 14, 1-6 (Malcom D. Evans
ed., forthcoming 2003) (uncorrected proofs on file with the author).
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of a domestic court may itself constitute a Chapter 11 "measure,"8 6 its
handling of litigation involving an investor may support a Chapter 11
87
claim.
B. Sources of Substantive Guidance
1. In General
Chapter 11 tribunals are instructed to apply the NAFTA text
and "applicable rules of international law. 88s In discharging this
mandate they have consulted, in addition to the treaty's text, nontreaty sources including custom, general principles, 89 reasoned
adjudications, and publicists. Among the customary principles relied
upon have been rules of treaty interpretation,9" elements of the law of
takings, 91 and principles of state responsibility. 9 2 Often to provide

86.
See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Jurisdiction, Jan. 5,
2001, l 39-60, at http://www.naftalaw.org.
87.
The United States has twice been named in denial of justice cases, in each
case by Canadian investors. As to each, the United States prevailed. The first to reach
an award was Mondev v. United States. Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2,
Oct. 11, 2002, at http://www.naftalaw.org. Mondev arose out of a 1978 tripartite
commercial real estate development contract among claimant's entity (LPA), the
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) and the City of Boston (the City). In part, the
contract granted LPA a land purchase option with the City, the exercise of which
allegedly was frustrated by the City's failure to accomplish certain tasks-failings said
by the investor to have been promoted by BRA. In the resulting lawsuit, the jury
agreed with LPA, issuing verdicts against both the City and BRA, totaling $16 million.
The trial judge upheld the verdict against the City, but by JNOV held BRA immune
from liability under Massachusetts law. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court
affirmed the trial court's immunity finding and overruled the breach of contract finding
against the City. LPA's request for rehearing was denied as was its petition for review
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Certain of Mondev's theories of recovery were disallowed
on jurisdictional grounds. Its denial of justice claim failed on the merits under a factdependent test enunciated by the tribunal after consulting modern jurisprudence and
other influences. Claimant had failed to demonstrate that "having regard to generally
accepted standards of the administration of justice ... in light of all the facts that the
impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable [thus resulting in] unfair
and inequitable treatment." Id. 1 127.
Loewen v United States was decided in June 2003, and, in contrast to Mondev, was
based on facts which, but for a failure to exhaust local remedies and certain
jurisdictional flaws, would have established denial of justice. Loewen Group, Inc.,
Decision on Jurisdiction, Jan. 5, 2001. See supra note 83, infra notes 188-202 and
accompanying text.
88.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art.1131(1).
89.
For example, a theory of tolling has been considered by at least one
tribunal, as a potentially applicable general principle of law. Feldman v. Mexico, Final
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Dec. 16, 2002, 58, at http:www.naftalaw.org,
90.
See infra notes 93, 245-46 and accompanying text.
91.
See infra notes 232.50 and accompanying text.
92.
See supra note 31, infra note 126 and accompanying text (questions of
attribution).
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evidence of custom, resort has been had to treaties and other texts
thought to codify custom, 93 certain International Law Commission
(ILC) drafts and reports, 94 and occasionally the Restatement (Third)
of the Law of Foreign Relations. 95 As developed below, open
borrowing from trade law decisions, and careful study of the awards
96
of other arbitral tribunals have been commonplace.
2. Consultation of Domestic Sources
NAFTA tribunals and the NAFTA bar have invoked various
domestic and private law principles. One finds in the awards
references to domestic administrative law, 97 decisional law98 and
legislation.9 9 Perhaps not surprisingly, rather than always being the
product of exacting comparative method, the national rules relied
upon have often been supplied by the jurisdictions in which the
arbitrators-most notably the presiding arbitrators-have been
trained. Thus, while in the abstract the link between a NAFTA case
and, for instance, the Greek Civil Code seems elusive, as an example
familiar to the tribunal it is understandable. 100
Though to consult general principles common to developed legal
systems is concordant with general conceptions of international law

93.
Most notably the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See S.D.
Meyers, Inc. v. Canada, Final Award on the Merits, Nov. 13, 2000, 11 201 at
http://www.naftalaw.org. See also Loewen Group, Inc., Final Award, June 26, 2003,
167 (discussing the Harvard Draft Convention of Professors Sohn & Baxter on the
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens (12th Draft), reprinted in
Louis B. Sohn & R.R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic
Interests of Aliens, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 545 (1961)).
94.
See id. 77 149, 153.
95.
The Restatement is openly consulted less frequently than one might expect.
The Feldman tribunal considered its provisions in relative detail however. See
Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, 77 99-106 (noting that both disputants had
made reference to it).
96.
It would be misleading to suggest that these sources invariably have been
studied sua sponte, since the submissions of the disputants drive the process to an
appreciable degree. Nevertheless, Chapter 11 arbitrators often bring to the task
considerable depth in public international law and they are not expected to ignore
helpful authority known to them.
97.
See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Final Award on Merits, Nov. 13, 2000, T 243, at
http://www.naftalaw.org (Separate Opinion by Dr. Bryan Schwartz).
98.
See, e.g., id. 1 249; supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing
Canadian and US decisions).
99.
See Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, 58.
100.
Id. But see M. Shahabuddeen, Municipal Law Reasoning in International
Law, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 90, 92 (Vaughan Lowe

& Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996) (among the dangers of reliance on private law is
the tendency "to resort to notions peculiar to [a particular] municipal law").
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sources, 10 1 there are limits to which analogies supplied by private law
can be employed; at least one Chapter 11 tribunal has been clear that
silence in the NAFTA text does not irresistibly lead to adoption of a
02
private law approach.'
3. International Authorities
a. Adjudication
In addition to the quite understandable tendency to consult the
reasoned decisions of other Chapter 11 arbitrators (returned to
below), Chapter 11 tribunals have often referred to the decisions of
other international tribunals such as the International Court of
Justice, 10 3 the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 10 4 various claims

101.
See generally Maurice Mendelson, The International Court of Justice and
Sources of International Law, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 63, 79-80 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
102.
The Loewen Tribunal opined:
It is true that some aspects of the resolution of disputes arising in relation to
private international commerce are imported into the NAFTA system.. .and that
the handling of disputes within that system by professionals experienced in the
handling of international arbitration has tended in practice to make NAFTA
arbitration look like the more familiar kind of process. But this apparent
resemblance is misleading. The two forms of process, and the rights which they
enforce, have nothing in common. There is no warrant for transferring rules
derived from private law into a field of international law where the claimants
are permitted for convenience to enforce what are in origin the rights of Party
states.
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, June 26, 2003,
233, at
http://www.naftalaw.org.
103,
This includes repeated consultation of the ICJ's chamber award in the
ELSI case. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), Judgment,
1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20). See Loewen Group, Inc., Final Award, June 26, 2003, 160.
104.
Given the extensive and readily available jurisprudence on expropriation
produced by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, one might have expected within NAFTA
awards far more frequent references to its awards. One explanation is the broader
mandate of that tribunal-extending to certain non-expropriatory property
interference-and the historical setting in which those claims arose. See Vicki Been &
Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protections and
the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings "Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 30, 30 nn.29-135 and accompanying text (2003). Additionally, the jurisprudence of
the Tribunal has been subject to a sustained disparagement from some quarters, being
characterized for example as merely lex specialis with limited general applicability. See
RICHARD B. LILLICH, BURNS H. WESTON, & DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL
CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS: 1975-1995 8 (1999)
("withering attack," albeit rebuffed). Among the better one-volume references on the
Tribunal are CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1998), and GEORGE ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-U.S.
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1996).
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commissions, 10 5 numerous tribunals convened under the ICSID
Convention, 10 6 and certain ad hoc arbitration tribunals. 107 GATT and
WTO jurisprudence has been consulted both in relation to NAFTA
provisions with obvious trade law analogues, such as Article 1102
(treatment "no less favorable than" that accorded nationals) and for
1 08
principles of international adjudication.
b. Texts, Commentaries, and Publicists
In relation to the mounting literature on Chapter 11, tribunals
have been very selective; more often than not, individual publicists
have been cited for their works of general importance, not for essays
specific to Chapter 11, and certain standard references, many timehonored, have
been
regularly
consulted.
For
example,

105.
See, e.g., Mondev v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/99/2, Oct.11, 2002, % 114, at http://www.naftalaw.org (General Claims
Commission, U.S.-Mex.).
106.
As to which, see supra notes 8 and 13 and accompanying text and infra
notes 151-52, accompanying text and authority cited there.
107.
In Metalclad, an ad hoc award under the UNCITRAL Rules featured with
perhaps surprising prominence in the arbitration, and consequently in the subsequent
set aside proceedings in British Columbia. The Metalclad tribunal found influential
Biloune v. Ghana Investments, 95 I.L.R. 183 (1993). See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico,
Final Award,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB
(AF)/9711,
Aug.
30, 2000,
at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ cases/awards.htm (citing Biloune at 207-10, noting in
common government assurances about a building permit and consequent construction,
followed by forced termination of project). The Biloune arbitrators had found an
indirect taking, just as the Metalclad tribunal later did. Justice Tysoe in adjudicating
Mexico's request for set aside, examined Biloune, found it readily distinguishable from
the case before the Metalclad tribunal and concluded that it could not have been meant
to be the rationale behind the finding of taking. See Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., Reasons
for Judgment of the Honorable Mr. Justice Tysoe, May 2, 2001, 1 80, at
http://www.naftalaw.org. Tysoe has attracted criticism for second guessing the
tribunal, which had openly characterized Biloune as "persuasive authority." See infra
notes 132-39 and accompanying text. The Biloune tribunal was highly distinguished
and was presided over by H.E. Judge Stephen Schwebel, of the ICJ, a fact no doubt
enhancing the resulting award's attractiveness as guidance.
108.
See, e.g., Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Final Merits Award, Apr. 10, 2001, 1 49,
at http://www.naftalaw.org (examining GATT, art. 111.4; TRIMS and GATS, art.
XVII(1-3) examined in response to Canada's argument that defacto discrimination
must cause "disproportionate" harm in order to be actionable). In an example of
procedural borrowing, the Feldman tribunal cited the WTO's Appellate Body in ruling
that when one disputant adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption of truth,
the burden shifts to the other party to rebut the presumption by competent evidence.
Feldman v. Mexico, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1, Dec. 16, 2002, 9 177,
at http://www.naftalaw.org. In Feldman, the transplanted rule determined the
outcome, for the claimant had set forth sufficient support for its claim of sub-national
treatment to establish a "presumption and a prima facie case" under Article 1102.
Mexico, in response, had "failed to introduce any credible evidence into the record to
rebut that presumption." Id. A majority of the tribunal drew the inference that had
equal treatment been accorded, Mexico would certainly have supplied proof of it, rather
than relying heavily on a more technical and tenuous theory of defense. Id. 1 178.
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Amerasinghe, 10 9 Bourchard, 110 Cheng, 111 de Arechaga, 112
Freeman'1 3 are among the names one encounters several times.

1407

and

C. Reasoning Methodologies and Tribunal Attitudes
Both within a given tribunal and among tribunals, Chapter 11
arbitrators have represented a diverse range of legal traditions: civil
law, common law, and mixed. 114 Whatever the tribunal's makeup, the
arguments of advocates and the authority they have marshaled have
often dictated much of its focus and analysis. Many of the awards
produced seem to share, methodologically, a common law influence.
Despite the absence of stare decisis,115 prior awards have often been
carefully dissected, sometimes cited with approval, and sometimes
distinguished on their facts.
Substantively, tribunals have often been progressive in adapting,
refining, and articulating governing principles and as in matters of
procedure, have often relied for inspiration on NAFTA's objects and
purposes. 116 Despite the unifying influences mentioned below, the
decentralization built into Chapter l1's system of ad hoc
adjudications has produced variations in approach, tone and
principle. Unanimous awards have been common. Nevertheless,
separate opinions, both concurring 1 7 and dissenting, 118 have
occasionally been authored - often to the great benefit of the reader.
Invariably, the individual facts of the particular case have proven
pivotal.
Despite being invited to by respondent states, tribunals, in
general, have not been quick to adopt narrow meanings of such words
as "investment," "investor," "measure," and the like, in part because

109.
C.F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990).
110.
EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD
(1915).
111.
BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1953).

112.
Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a
Century, 159 RECUEIL DES COURS (Hague Academy of Int'l L.) (1978).
113.
ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR
DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1938).

114.
See infra tbl. 3.
115.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136(1) (only disputants bound by Chapter
11 awards).
116.
As they have been instructed to do by NAFTA itself. Id. art. 102(2).
117.
See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Final Award on the Merits, Nov. 13,
2000, at http://www.naftalaw.org (Separate Opinion of Dr. Bryan Schwartz).
118.
See, e.g., Feldman v. Mexico, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1,
Dec. 16, 2002, 6, at http://www.naftalaw.org (dissent of Arb. Bravo).
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those terms are broadly defined in NAFTA itself.119 They have also
distinguished conditions that are fundamental to their jurisdiction
from procedural conditions more appropriately thought of as clerical
or going to claim admissibility. 120 Open rebukes of legal formalisms
sometimes have surfaced, 121 and claimants have been allowed to
evolve theories of recovery and to amend claims during the course of
122
proceedings, absent prejudice to the respondent.

D. Unifying Forces
1. In General
The decentralized and fragmentary nature of international law
sources and the differing backgrounds of the arbitrators and
advocates have combined with many questions of first impression to
generate differing approaches to identical issues. Nevertheless, even
in the absence of a unifying appellate mechanism, several
influences-both formal and informal-have promoted convergence
on several points. These influences include cross-consultation of
decisions among NAFTA tribunals, the NAFTA Parties' Article 1128
submissions and responsive pleadings, the binding interpretations
those parties may jointly issue, and the set-aside jurisprudence
produced by domestic courts.

119.
That is not to suggest that disingenuous positions have been the norm.
Though illuminated in part by definitions, critical words such as "investment" and
"measure," are sufficiently elastic to allow room for good faith advocacy by claimants
and respondents alike.
120.
See generally Brower, supra note 4, at 84.
121.
See, e.g., Mondev v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/99/1, Dec. 16, 2002, 86, at http://www.naftalaw.org ("[i]nternational law does not
place emphasis on merely formal considerations"). The preference for substance over
form has been evident in several respects. The arbitrators have often examined the
motivation behind a given claim submission requirement, questioned whether its strict
enforcement would be consistent with the investor protections sought to be promoted
by Chapter 11, considered whether the respondent had suffered any genuine prejudice
as a result of the alleged defect, and assessed whether rigorously enforcing a
procedural predicate would merely defer the bringing of an ostensibly viable claim. See
Weiler, Ethyl- Harbinger,supra note 4, at 192-95. Some of the same considerations
naturally influence tribunals in determining as a preliminary matter the exact content
of the rule invoked.
122.
See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/97/1, Aug. 30, 2000,
64-69, at http://www.naftalaw.org (future reliance on
Ecology Decree signaled in claimant's memorial; opportunity to address its effect given
to respondent in counter-memorial and rejoinder).
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2. Inter-Tribunal Cross-Fertilization
The ready availability of Chapter 11 awards and associated
materials has equipped disputants to invoke in a current proceeding
the reasoning of other NAFTA tribunals. 123 The willingness of
arbitrators to consult and sometimes adopt the reasoning of other
Chapter 11 tribunals has generated, if somewhat unpredictably,
strands of uniformity. 124 One suspects, moreover, that even when a
prior award is not embraced, the added reflection stimulated by a
competing view has exerted a beneficial influence on award quality.
3. Direct and Indirect Submissions of Non-Disputant Parties
Non-disputant NAFTA Parties may contribute their views to
sitting Chapter 11 Tribunals in at least two, non-binding ways: one is
direct, the other indirect. First, NAFTA states that are not party to a
particular Chapter 11 proceeding are, under Article 1128, entitled to
make submissions on questions of interpretation. 1 25 In contrast to the
Interpretations rendered jointly by the three Parties under Article
1131(2), Article 1128 submissions do not necessarily evince a single
view. Accordingly, in addition to stimulating further comments by the
disputants, they may serve a moderating function, either because the
respondent state softens its position in anticipation of the potentially
contradicting views of its NAFTA co-Parties or because it does not,
leaving differing views before the tribunal. 12 6 Nothing, of course,
prevents the Parties from collaborating before making Article 1128
submissions. Regardless of whether they do, where their views agree,

123.
The web sites of the NAFTA governments and ICSID publish many
important materials, as does the NAFTA website. See http://www.nafta.org. Moreover,
counsel within the NAFTA bar tend to consult each other, sharing information to
varying degrees.
See, e.g., Loewen Group, Inc., Final Award, June 26, 2003, If 133, at
124.
http://www.naftalaw.org (quoting with approval the denial of justice test articulated in
Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1). See also id. If 126 (adopting the principle
enunciated in Azinian that Chapter 11 tribunals do not stand as appellate courts in
relation to domestic courts).
125.
See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Jurisdiction, Jan. 5,
2001,
35, at http://www.naftalaw.org (submissions by Mexico on the meaning of
"measure" and on the import of certain Chapter 11 awards).
126.
For example, in Metalclad the U.S.'s Article 1128 observations confuting an
interpretation sponsored by Mexico were largely adopted by the Tribunal. See
Metalclad Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, 7 27, 73 (local government acts
attributable to host state for purposes of NAFTA).
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a tribunal, though not bound by the apparent accord, generally will
take due account of it.

127

The NAFTA Parties have regularly exercised their right to make
submissions as non-disputants. Their submissions, however, are often
selective in the questions addressed. Such self-restraint is a function
of resources and of prudential considerations; unlike many private
litigants, states must consider both the reciprocal and long-term
implications of a views they sponsor, and how those views mesh with
past positions they have taken. There is no doubt a tension between
the dual roles of each NAFTA Party. Ultimately, each is both a home
state to investors requiring protection abroad and a member of a class
of perpetual respondents.
Concurrently, the inter-Party distribution of pleadings promoted
by an explicit NAFTA provision 128 has resulted, functionally
speaking, in indirect submissions by non-disputant states.
Specifically, it is not unusual for a NAFTA respondent in one
proceeding to rely on views independently taken in other proceedings
by one or both of the other two NAFTA states. Whether the objective
is to formally suggest to the arbitrators a species of state practice or
merely to offer evidence of the NAFTA Parties' intent, the concordant
views of the Parties become available for tribunal consideration.
4. Binding Interpretations
As noted above and more fully treated below, 129 Chapter l's
governing law provision 130 instructs tribunals to decide by reference
to applicable rules of international law, the NAFTA text, and any
interpretations issued by the NAFTA Fair Trade Commission (FTC).
The FTC's interpretations, though having no direct effect on the
content of custom, by definition establish a common meaning to the
NAFTA text in question, representing the only formal, centralized,
mechanism for unifying NAFTA jurisprudence. The Commission has
produced one such interpretation, eliminating certain questions
131
raised by Article 1105 and prompting others.

127.
Cf. Mondev, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/991i, 1 103-27 (taking note of
common ground among submissions of disputants and Parties in formulating modern
test for denial of justice).
128.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1129.
129.
See infra notes 131, 217-31 and accompanying text
130.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1131.
131.
The Interpretive Note has generated questions about the interpretation
mechanism itself, such as: when does a purported "interpretation" constitute a de facto
amendment (a power not vested in the FTC), must such interpretations be given effect
in pending arbitrations, and should they have any effect in post-award proceedings
assessing the award? See infra notes 230-231 and accompanying text. For arbitrator
discussion of some of these questions, see Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Award in
Respect of Damages (May 31, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 1347, 1355-59, and see generally Charles
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5. Set-Aside Precedent
The published set-aside decisions of domestic courts within the
NAFTA territories, though limited to narrow grounds of review, may
affect the content and formation of Chapter 11 jurisprudence. Though
instances of completed set aside proceedings are limited for the time
being to Justice Tysoe's Metalclad decision, 13 2 as that decision
illustrates, a court's examination of a tribunal's mandate often
traverses matters of substance. 133 Such open explorations may occur
as a natural by-product of matching the tribunal's apparent mandate
with the sources and powers it purported to employ. In Metalclad, the
tribunal found a failure to accord fair and equitable treatment under
Article 1105 and an expropriation (on two separate theories) obliging
Mexico to compensate the investor. Justice Tysoe partially set the
award aside, reasoning that the tribunal had exceeded its mandate by
announcing a transparency principle not expressly found in Chapter
11.134

The Tysoe opinion ventures observations about NAFTA's
architecture and about the resulting content of Articles 1105 and
1110. Though criticized by numerous commentators as being too
invasive, 135 Justice Tysoe's opinion adds to the available information
just as any thoughtfully-crafted decision would. As the only set-aside
judgment thus far, it has been studied by Chapter 11 tribunals, both
for interpretive guidance 136 and presumably in seeking to immunize
their awards from a similar fate. 137 Disputants have consulted it for

H. Brower, Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 78-86 (2003).
132.
Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., Reasons for Judgment of the Honorable Mr.
Justice Tysoe, May 2, 2001 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 2001).
133.
See Coe, supra note 8, at 198 n.91, 205 n.126 and accompanying text; Coe,
supra note 45, at 77-78.
134.
Justice Tysoe's decision is examined further at supra note 107 and infra
note 288 and accompanying text.
135.
See, e.g., Weiler, A Play in Three Parts, supra note 57 (lamenting invasion
of merits); Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001) (referring to Tysoe's review as,
inter alia, "heightened"). But see generally Thomas, Reply to Professor Brower, supra
note 9 (disputing that Justice Tysoe conducted a "heightened" review).
136.
See, e.g., Feldman v. Mexico, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/1,
Dec. 16, 2002,
133, at http://www.naftalaw.org ("While this Tribunal is not required
to reach the same result as the British Columbia court, it finds this aspect of their
decision instructive"). But see Pope & Talbot, 41 I.L.M. at 1356, n.37 (Tysoe's
construction of 1105 ipse dixit, and thus of questionable precedential value).
137.
The tendency on the part of Chapter 11 tribunals to present alternative
bases for their decisions, if not prompted by Metalclad, is certainly in keeping with its
approach. In that decision, it was the tribunal's alternative basis for finding an
expropriation that survived attack in Justice Tysoe's court. See Loewen Group, Inc.,
Final Award, June 26, 2003, at http://www.naftalaw.org (continuity of nationality and
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substantive insights and in assessing the relative suitability of
Vancouver as an arbitral seat. 138 Other courts asked to nullify
operating under the Model Law,
Chapter 11 awards, especially those
13 9
will no doubt refer to it as well.

V. POPULAR MISGIVINGS: FACT AND FABLE

A. In General
That Chapter 11 has commanded a remarkably diverse audience
is apparent from a perusal of the mounting literature. The
introduction of voices from outside the ranks of international law
specialists has occasioned fresh perspectives, eloquent studies,
popular oversimplifications and the occasional unmitigated canard.
Among experts as well, variations in orientation have engendered
shades of attitude reflected in expressions of concern and calls for
reform. While it is not the purpose of this essay to catalog and
critique the profusion of views in evidence, a brief exploration is
offered of recurrent themes bearing most heavily on systemic viability
and legitimacy. 140 What follows are introductory discussions of
private standing to assert treaty breaches (free of espousal and
exhaustion), substantive indeterminacy, process transparency,
arbitrator accountability and the impact of potential Chapter 11
liability on regulation.

failure to exhaust); Mondev v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/99/2, Oct. 11, 2002, at http://www.naftalaw.org (three year time bar and preNAFTA breach); ADF Group, Inc. v. United States, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/1, Jan. 9, 2003, at http://www.naftalaw.org (no violation of Articles 1102 and
procurement exemption).
138.
To the author's knowledge, Vancouver has been designated as an arbitral
seat once since the Metalclad decision was rendered. While certain counsel have
advised against Vancouver as a place for Chapter 11 arbitration on the basis of Justice
Tysoe's decision, others find the opinion unalarming.
139.
The set aside ruling in the S.D. Myers is forthcoming from another
Canadian court.
140.
"Legitimacy," a now-popular term, is used variously by different writers,
some having in mind, for example, the stimulating thought of Professor Thomas
Franck, in Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 706 (1988).
By contrast, I use it in a non-technical sense to connote the sum total of attributes that
inspire confidence in, and rightfully perpetuate, a given system or result. In using the
term I do not necessarily, therefore, have reference to, or attempt to answer, the
legitimacy concerns expressed about Chapter 11 by others. For an illustrative list of
commentators expressing concerns, see Charles H. Brower II, NAFTA's Investment
Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-Generation Rights, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
(forthcoming Nov. 2003). See also Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of Transborder
Arbitration,56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773, 828-29 (2002) (describing and replying to certain
critics).
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B. Chapter 11 as "Unprecedented"
1. The Labels and Underlying Sensibilities
14 1
Some commentators have referred to Chapter 11 as "unique"'
or "unprecedented. '142 Characterizations of this type typically have
reference to a cluster of Chapter 11 attributes and potentialities.
Most prominently these include the direct standing conferred on
investors in relation to alleged Chapter 11 breaches 14 3 and the
corresponding possibility that a state may be required to pay
damages, possibly for activities undertaken for a public purpose in
circumstances in which that sovereign's own courts have been
shunned by the investor 14 4 and in which that sovereign's own citizens
may not have been able to recover. 145 Some commentators also
emphasize the high number of Chapter 11 claims likely to arise and
the corresponding prospect that both NAFTA state coffers and
regulatory zeal will suffer. 146 More specifically, Chapter 11 is thought
to be different from existing investment treaties because of its
tripartite character, the well-developed regulatory apparatuses in
place in two of the three countries, the high volume of trade involved
and the resulting possibility that powerful enterprises-inevitably
affected by regulation-will use Chapter 11 to shift business risks
properly borne by themselves to NAFTA territory taxpayers. The
notions that direct standing is novel and ill-considered are addressed
in the immediately following sections; the question of chilling effect is
discussed more fully under Subsection G below.

141.
Swan, supra note 4, at 166.
142.
Lydia Lazar, NAFTA Dispute Resolution: Secret Corporate Weapon?, 1(3) J.
GLOBAL FIN. MARKETS 49 (Winter 2000).
143.
Cf. Thomas, Reply to Professor Brower, supra note 9, at 460 (Chapter 11
disputes mechanism is an extraordinary elevation of private standing to assert
international legal rights owed to a state). But see generally Charles H. Brower, Beware
the Jabberwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465 (2002)
(arguing Chapter 11 disputes mechanism is meant to function within general
framework for international commercial arbitration) [hereinafter Brower, Reply to Mr.
Thomas].
144.
Cf. infra notes 181-85 (the Metalclad example).
145.
See Been & Beauvais, supra note 104, at 41-43. The authors conclude that
the competitive advantage potentially given foreign investors under international law
relative to local enterprises is more concretely detrimental than the potential chill on
regulation, which they regard as more speculative. Id. at 77.
146.
See also infra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
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2. Chapter 11's Lineage
In light of not too recent treaty practice, comment denying
Chapter 11 of a pedigree may tend to mislead. 147 At least thirty years
before Chapter 11 took effect, BITs had begun to both grant direct
investor standing and to waive the local remedies rule, often in
connection with a designation of ICSID arbitration. 148 By the time
NAFTA took effect, numerous U.S. BITs had established the right of
foreign investors to bring arbitral claims against the United States,
149
in exchange for reciprocal rights for U.S. investors.
150
Like their European counterparts,
U.S. BITs in increasing
numbers contemplate that a tribunal composed exclusively or
partially of foreign lawyers (typically holding no judicial rank in their
home countries) will be empowered, for the single dispute in question,
to award damages to an investor, subject to little or no judicial
review, perhaps based on state conduct that was perfectly lawful as a
matter of domestic law. This central thesis animates the highly
successful ICSID Convention' 5 1 and it is to this basic model that
international agencies point in counseling states seeking to attract
foreign direct investment. 152 It was to a variation of this formula that
the creators of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal turned over two

147.
Professor Carbonneau seems to agree that certain characterizations of
Chapter 11 have been misleading, or in his words, "in effect, amounting to
misrepresentation . . . pitched at the level of deceit." Carbonneau, supra note 140, at
827 (with reference to certain incredulous journalists' failure to place the Chapter 11
process in context); see also infra note 156 and accompanying text. See generally Barton
Legum, The Innovation of NAFTA Investor-StateArbitration, 43 HARV. INT'L L. J. 531
(2002) (tracing mixed claims processes historically and demonstrating that Chapter 11
is not wholly novel).
148.
See generally Antonio R. Parra, Provisions on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes in Modern Investment Laws, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Multilateral
Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV. 287 (1997); Na6n, supra note 3, at 85-88.
149.
See, e.g., Senegal-U.S. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement
and Protection of Investment, art.VII (1986), reprinted in KENNETH VANDEVELDE,
UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES POLICY AND PRACTICE App. B, at 120 (1992)
(calling for ICSID Arbitration upon failure of collaborative means).
150.
See generally RUDOLPH DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES 1-11 (1995).

151.
The literature regarding the Convention is considerable and of a high
quality. For a seemingly exhaustive bibliography, see CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE
ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1291-1329 (2001). For an instructive and
insightful account of ICSID Convention arbitration that outlines the process concisely,
see Abby Cohen Smutny, ArbitrationBefore the InternationalCentre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, 3 Bus. L. INT'L 367 (2002).
152.
See also Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 7 ICSID
REV. 297, 306 (1992) (World Bank formulation recommending investor-state
arbitration). See generally Ibrahim Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of
Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. 1 (1986).
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decades ago 15 3 and from which the drafters of the ill-fated
Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA) took inspiration in
composing its investor-host dispute provisions. 154 While the
uninitiated may find the standard dispute features of modern BITs
and Chapter 11 remarkable, those texts adhere to a norm that
persists also in post-1994 treaty practice, serving as a model even for
155
Mexican BIT's.
C. Direct Standing or Espousal?
1. The Question
As noted above, for some critics, the seemingly unbridled
prerogative of wealthy corporations to promote their narrow interests
through NAFTA claims without having to consult broader societal
priorities is part of what condemns Chapter 11.156 Given that the
obligations relied upon are owed among states and not directly to
NAFTA Party citizens, should not claims of private injury be
moderated by interposing home-state discretion in the claims
process? Should not some mechanism prevent the disruption of
initiatives common to states acting for the common good? Traditional
espousal was such a mechanism.
2. Espousal: State of Nationality as Traditional Protector
Under the traditional method still functioning today,
international obligations-such as the rules governing treatment of
aliens and their property-primarily bind states inter se.
Mistreatment of an alien was for the state of nationality to pursue, in

153.
See generally BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 104, at 16-20.
154.
See also Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34 INVL LAW. 1033, 1045-46 (2000) (finding
investor-state approach to disputes not new, but opposed by NGO's). See generally
Christopher N. Camponovo, Comment, Dispute Settlement and the OECD Multilateral
Agreement on Investment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181 (1996). But see S.D.

Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Final Award on the Merits, Nov. 13, 2000, 11 84-86 (Separate
Opinion of Dr. Bryan Schwartz), at http://www.naftalaw.org (fear of chilling liability
and disruptive claims delayed MAI).
155.
See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Swiss Confederation and
the United Mexican States, July 10, 1995, Switz.-Mex. (provisions inspired by NAFTA).
156.
See generally Bill Moyers Reports: Trading Democracy (PBS television
broadcast), available at http://www.pbs.org/now/printable/transcripttdfull-print.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2003) (transcript also on file with author). But see Carbonneau,
supra note 140, at 827 ("Nothing is ever said-and, therefore, understood-about the
larger operation and aspirations of NAFTA. The critics never bothered to communicate
an understanding of the difficulty of international adjudication or of how instrumental
a functional system of adjudication is to the pursuit of international trade").
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its discretion, by exercising "diplomatic protection," thus "espousing"
its citizen's claim. 157 The corresponding lack of private standing on
the international plane left aggrieved parties to seek redress in the
domestic courts. Justice in host state courts often proved elusive,
however, for reasons not difficult to imagine, while in the investor's
home fora, questions of state immunity and separation of powers
15 8
often delayed or foreclosed a remedy.
Difficulties facing investors in domestic courts, and foreign
governments' corresponding reluctance to appear there, would be less
significant if the mechanism of diplomatic protection provided a
serviceable substitute. By its nature, however, the doctrine of
diplomatic protection confers on the state of nationality wide latitude
in determining, what-if anything-to do about an alleged breach.159
The calculus dictating the avenue chosen might be informed by the
full range of interests and imperatives affecting states in an
interdependent world; for the aggrieved investor the doctrine's
discretionary nature and sometimes non-transparent mechanisms
provide only limited control and predictability. Limitations on ICJ
jurisdiction 160 in turn resulted in only episodic availability of the
standing tribunal arguably best-suited to deciding such disputes.
Though increasing numbers of inter-state arbitration provisions in
bilateral treaties have provided an alternative to the ICJ, states
remain only somewhat efficient and effective in marshaling claims,
especially where only a single investor is involved. Moreover, where
multiple claims have arisen (such as from a nationalization), the
lump sum settlements often reached frequently do not make investors
whole.161

From the vantage of the host state, diplomatic protection is
encumbered by additional defects, not least its reputation as a
prerogative available only to powerful states that have used it as a

157.
See generally PreliminaryReport of the InternationalLaw Commission on
Diplomatic Protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/484 (1998) [hereinafter Preliminary Report];
Werner Goldschmidt, Transactions Between States and Public Firms and Private
Foreign Firms (A Methodological Study), in 136 RECUEIL DES COURS 203, 239-42 (1972

II); LAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 406-07 (5th ed. 1998);
PETER MALUNCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 25657 (7th ed. 1997); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSIONS' ARTICLES
ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 223-24 (2002).

See, e.g., Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (act of
158.
state doctrine precluded judicial consideration of foreign government's alleged taking of
property); see also Pearce & Coe, supra note 3, at 317-19 nn.27-28 (discussing act of
state doctrine and sovereign immunity questions and providing related authority).
159.
See PreliminaryReport, supra note 157, at 2-4.
160.

JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN

LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 132-68 (1999). See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 157, at 728-30;
J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 121-129, 168-169 (3d ed. 1998).
161.
WESTON, LILLICH & BEDERMAN, supra note 104, at 84-88 (lump sum
agreements often, but not invariably, lead to partial compensation).
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pretext for undue reprisals. 162 A powerful reminder of these concerns
is Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention, which rewards a host state's
offer to arbitrate direct investment claims by disallowing the
investor's home state from exercising diplomatic protection once a
163
dispute has been submitted to ICSID.
2. Chapter 11 and Espousal
It follows from the foregoing that the trend Chapter 11 follows in
granting private standing to make direct claims is neither
experimental nor accidental. Espousal, though responsible for
interesting investment-related decisions, such as Barcelona
Traction164 and ELSI,165 would mesh poorly with NAFTA's stated
objective of creating "effective procedures for .. .the resolution of
1 66
disputes."'
For host states the direct standing approach (combined with the
foreclosure of other avenues) greatly limits their exposure both to
municipal court actions abroad and diplomatic protection. It also
signifies to prospective investors and to other stakeholders that
protections corresponding to the prevailing model are in place in the

162.
Shihata, supra note 152, at 15-16. Judge Padilla's separate opinion in the
Barcelona Tractioncase is characteristic of these misgivings:
The history of the responsibility of States in respect to the treatment of foreign
nationals is the history of abuses, illegal interference in the domestic
jurisdiction of weaker States, unjust claims, threats and even military
aggression under the flag of exercising rights of protection, and the imposing of
sanctions in order to oblige a Government to make the reparation demanded.
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 246 (Feb. 5).
163.
Diplomatic protection may be exercised, however, if the arbitrating state
fails to abide by any award ultimately rendered against it. ICSID Convention, supra
note 10, art. 27(1). The prospect of diplomatic protection supplies an inducement to
states to comply promptly with ICSID awards, but would appear not to preclude
parallel resort to private mechanisms for enforcing the award.
164.
Barcelona Traction Power & Light Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1964 I.C.J. 6
(Preliminary Objections); Barcelona Traction Power & Light Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3 (2d Phase).
165.
ELSI, Judgment, supra note 103. ELSI is distinguishable in that it was
before a Chamber of the ICJ, and may be presumed to have been more efficient than
would a full Court proceeding. Nevertheless, it remained an espoused claim, and as
Keith Highet wrote, "In the Hydra-headed example of a derivative claim in an espousal
case ... matters are not so simple. There were at least two 'clients' here [Raytheon and
the United States in dual capacities]." Keith Highet, Evidence, the Chamber and the
ELSI Case, in FACT-FINDING BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 33, 43 (Richard B.
Lillich ed., 1990) (referring to the problems of national-home state cooperation in
attempting to produce convincing evidence and argument).
166.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102(1)(e).
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host country. 16 7 For investors, direct arbitration provides an
independent, expert, systemically neutral alternative to domestic
courts, especially those of the host state. It also carries greater
autonomy, control, efficiency, and predictability than diplomatic
protection, while producing a result that is globally enforceable by
68
treaty.'
D. Direct Standing and Exhaustion of Local Remedies
1. Exhaustion In General
The doctrine that an aggrieved foreign national must exhaust
local remedies before it--or its state of nationality-brings a claim
against the host state on the international plane is well established in
customary international law, 169 so much so that a distinguished
chamber of the International Court of Justice, as recently as 1989,
was unwilling to infer, without a convincing basis, that the doctrine
did not obtain under the bilateral treaty there involved. In that case
(the ELSI decision) the majority opinion referred to the exhaustion
doctrine as "an important principle of customary international
70
law."1
It is not from simple inertia that the exhaustion doctrine still
occupies a place in custom, and its underlying policies are not difficult
to divine. Allowing the host state's internal mechanisms of redress to
operate may result in an expeditious adjustment to the dispute,
saving that state the embarrassment of an international claim and
adding deference and, perhaps, fairness to the process. In settings in
which the alternative is home state espousal, successful resort to
municipal remedies spares the two states involved the negative
effects of adversarial dealings. Requiring domestic proceedings
moreover promotes a ripening of claims and helps develop a factual
base that may facilitate more informed adjudication in any

167.
See Mohamed I. Khalil, Treatment of Foreign Investment in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 7 ICSID REV. 339, 382 (1992) (vast majority of 335 BITs and
similar treaties surveyed contained ICSID arbitration provisions); cf. Caron, supra note
26, at 155 (investment flows stimulated by availability of arbitration); Ibrahim F. I.
Shihata, Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment-A General Account with Particular
Reference to the Role of the World Bank, 6 ICSID REV. 484, 505 (World Bank sponsored
ICSID to foster environment conducive to investment). But see Been & Beauvais, supra
note 104, at 123 n.432 (no evidence that treaty protections encourage investment).
168.
Both the ICSID and New York Conventions have over 100 parties. See ITA
Bibliography, supra note 3, at 10 (table of treaty adherence).
See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 157, at 496-506; M. SORNARAJAH, THE
169.
SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 328-29 (2000); C.F. Amerasinghe,

Whither the Local Remedies Rule?, 5 ICSID REV. 292 (1990); Nsongurua J. Udombana,
So Far, So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the African
Commission on Human and People's Rights, 97 AM. J. INTL L. 1, 3-6 (2003).
170.
ELSI, Judgment, supra note 103, at 42.
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subsequent international proceeding. Particularly in a case of an
alleged denial of justice, it may make little sense to credit the claim
where the domestic mechanisms in place for addressing low level
justice system missteps have not been pursued. Given the forgoing
and related considerations, at least one commentator has concluded
that exhaustion ought to be encouraged, if not required, in at least
71
some Chapter 11 arbitrations.1
As a matter of first principles, however, states may through
treaty waive the local remedies rule. In the context of a treaty
intended to promote investment by supplying effective dispute
resolution means, there may be solid reasons to eliminate the
exhaustion phase in perfecting the claim. Apart from the argument
that exhaustion makes illusory a sovereign's commitment to
arbitrate, 172 are the delay that ponderous domestic adjudication may
produce and the corresponding effects of the passage of time (such as
degradation in evidence). Further, domestic courts may not offer
satisfactory levels of neutrality and transparency, defects not easily
addressed by a Chapter 11 proceeding given the rigors of establishing
denial of justice.' 73 When exhaustion applies, the requirement adds
an issue for tribunal consideration and an additional hurdle for the
claimant to overcome. 1 74 To the extent that the claimant elects to
forgo a theoretically available avenue, moreover, the tribunal must
determine whether the remedy forsaken was effectively futile so that
claimant's foreshortening of the process can be forgiven.' 75
2. Chapter 11 and Exhaustion
No Chapter 11 provision explicitly addresses whether investors
are required to exhaust local remedies. From its overall architecture
a compelling inference nevertheless arises that no such requirement
applies as a general matter-a departure from the customary rule.
Rather than encouraging exhaustion, a confluence of provisions

171.
William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and Errors Under
NAFTA ChapterEleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 572 (2002). Professor Dodge holds that
certain architectural changes would be necessary to establish the requirement. Id. at
573.
172.
See Arthur T. von Merhen, Arbitration Between States and Foreign
Enterprises: The Significance of the Institute of International Law's Santiago de
Compostela Resolution, 5 ICSID REV. 54, 61-62 (1990) (discussing Resolution, Article 8:
"[A] requirement of exhaustion of local remedies as a condition is not admissible unless
the arbitration agreement provides otherwise"). The resolution is reprinted id. at 139.
173.
See supra note 87, infra notes 188-202, 251 and accompanying text.
174.
Under a prevailing view, at least once the issue is properly raised, the
burden is on the claimant to demonstrate that available remedies have been
exhausted. See Loewen, Final Award, supra note 31, T 215.
175.
See id. T 207-11 (discussing whether failure to seek Supreme Court
review would be excused).
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establish a cooling off period and, through a waiver requirement,
disallow most domestic proceedings that might otherwise parallel the
arbitration. 176 In relation to claims brought against Mexico, an
attempt to rely on NAFTA in a domestic court, moreover, may
11
Chapter
precluding subsequent
constitute
an election
177
the
exhaustion
question
Nevertheless, in certain cases
arbitration.
has featured with sufficient gravity in the disputants' pleadings that
the tribunals have addressed the doctrine's applicability. The awards
in Metalclad and Feldman both devoted attention to the question:
both found that exhaustion is not required, 178 a conclusion also
reached by commentators 179 and other Chapter 11 tribunals. 8 0
Against this background, the Loewen tribunal's final award is
remarkable. As discussed below, the tribunal interpreted Chapter 11
as requiring exhaustion, at least in denial of justice cases. To place
Loewen in context, brief consideration of Metalclad-a non-denial of
justice case-follows.
3. Metalclad
That exhaustion has not been required is illustrated well by
Metalclad, the first claim filed against Mexico. 1 8 ' The claimant there
asserted breaches of Articles 1105 and 1110. Among the pivotal
events in the case were a municipality's insistence that the investor
apply for a certain permit and that municipality's subsequent refusal
to issue that permit. The investor's initial tack was to attempt

See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121(1); supra note 54 (discussing Waste
176.
Mgmt. 1). The argument for implied exemption from the exhaustion requirement is that
the NAFTA parties, while affirmatively requiring the investor to repudiate local
remedies if wishing to arbitrate, were silent on the seemingly related question of
exhaustion. Though the waiver requirement may simply be aimed at preventing
inconsistent decisions arising out of the same measure, the implication is that an
investor may shun domestic redress provided it is prepared to not prosecute parallel
actions--one in arbitration, one in local courts. If an investor were required to exhaust
local remedies concerning the measure complained of, there would be little left to
waive, rendering Article 1121 superfluous.
NAFTA Annex 1120.1 records Mexico's stipulation that an investor "may
177.
not allege that Mexico has breached an obligation under [Chapter 11] both in an
arbitration under [Chapter 11] and before a Mexican court or administrative tribunal."
The apparent effect is to prevent an unsuccessful NAFTA-based court claim before a
Mexican court from being followed by a second attempt through Chapter 11 arbitration
(or vice versa). NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1120.1.
97 n.4; Feldman, Final Award,
178.
See Metalclad, Award, supra note 41,
supra note 31, 1 71-73.
179.
See Pearce & Coe, supra note 3, at 323-24; William S. Dodge, National
Courts and InternationalArbitration: Exhaustion of Remedies and Res Judicata Under
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L REV. 357, 373-76 (2000);
Dodge, supra note 171, at 572-77.
Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49, 126.
180.
See Dodge, supranote 57; Weiler, supra note 57.
181.
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reversal of the municipality's decision by petitioning the municipality
itself.1 8 2 It discontinued its effort after losing at that level, preferring
rather to pursue collaborative initiatives and ultimately Chapter 11
arbitration.1 8 3 The claim's admissibility was not affected by
Metalclad's abandonment of local court avenues. 184 Technically,
Metalclad did more than it was required to by seeking an
administrative remedy. Importantly, however, its claim was not
185
predicated on alleged mistreatment in Mexican courts.
4. Consequences for the Non-Exhausting Investor
Metalclad also demonstrates the more subtle substantive
consequences of removing the exhaustion requirement. To the extent
the claimant based its allegations of unfair and inequitable treatment
on the actions of the municipality, it could do so without placing those
acts in the context of the entire Mexican system for correcting lowlevel errors. That is, Mexico faced the conundrum of arguing that
fairness must be considered in light of the sum total of remedial
mechanisms available to the investor while appearing not to ask the
tribunal to penalize the investor for doing exactly what Chapter 11
allows. Though in Metalclad, the investor's failure to exhaust the
court system had little apparent bearing on the award, Mexico
successfully made its point (under a different guise) in Feldman,8 6 in
which the tribunal was influenced by the investor's failure seasonably
to clarify by formal ruling its entitlement to certain tax rebates. 8 7v In
Feldman, the investor's inaction was reflected in the tribunal's
assessment of the merits, not claim admissibility. Regardless, it
underscores that a claimant fails to vigorously consolidate its rights
within the domestic system to its peril.

182.
Metalclad, Counter Memorial, at 183; Metalclad, Reply Brief, at 75 (briefs
on file with author).
183.
See generally Pearce & Coe, supra note 3, at 323-24 (Metalclad's counsel
discussing exhaustion).
184.
In a rare footnote, the tribunal observed that Mexico had not insisted that
exhaustion was required, and that its forbearance was concordant with the tribunal's
reading of Article 1121(2)(b). Metalclad,Award, supra note 41,
97 n.4.
185.
At the hearing, Metalclad's counsel made reference to the Municipality's
handling of its permit request as, among other things, an administrative denial of
justice and in its post-hearing brief commended to the tribunal consideration of Amco
v. Indonesia, Resubmitted Case, Award on the Merits (May 31, 1990), 1 ICSID REP.
569 (1993). Post-Hearing Brief at 17 n.43, submitted Nov. 9, 1999 (Brief on file with
author). Had the claimant more squarely relied on the theory as an autonomous basis
of recovery, its failure to exhaust local appeals may have raised questions similar to
those confronted in Loewen. See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text.
186.
Feldman, Final Award, supra note 31.
187.
Id.
114.
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5. Rethinking Exhaustion: Loewen v. United States
Loewen 188 arose out of a lawsuit brought in a Mississippi court
by certain American owned companies with close ties to Mississippi,
against a Canadian corporation and its U.S. subsidiary (the Loewen
companies). The plaintiffs action related to a troubled commercial
transaction between the parties and alleged breach of contract, unfair
competition and fraud. 189 According to the Chapter 11 tribunal's
subsequent evaluation of the proceedings, plaintiffs trial strategy
seemed calculated to inflame jury prejudice on the basis of the
defendant's national origin in comparison to plaintiffs own local
roots. The trial court failed to control the tactic or to take effective
measures to mitigate its effects with the jury, 190 which after a seven
week trial awarded the plaintiff $500 million, including $400 million
as punitive damages. 191 Thereafter, the Mississippi Supreme Court
declined Loewen's request to relax the 125 percent bonding
192
requirement applicable to appeals under Mississippi state law.
Loewen did not seek U.S. Supreme court revibw. In January of 1996,
Loewen settled the dispute, agreeing to pay the judgment holder $175

million. 193
In July of 1998, Ray Loewen and the Canadian parent entity
brought Chapter 11 claims, advancing among other bases of recovery,
denial of justice (subsumed within Article 1105's minimum
standard). 194 In June of 2003 both claims were dismissed on
jurisdictional grounds. 195 The award nevertheless contained
extensive dicta addressing the merits. In those passages, the tribunal
concluded that despite the highly deficient state court proceedings
prompting the claim, 196 the Loewen claims would have failed under
the local remedies rule. The tribunal reasoned that the failure to seek

188.
Loewen, Final Award, supra note 31. For pre-award factual summary and
analysis see generally Dodge, Trials, supra note 171, at 563-67 and Robert E. Lutz &
Russell C. Trice, NAFTA at Five and the Loewen Case, TRANSLEX 1 (Oct. 1999).
189.
Loewen, Final Award, supra note 31, 4 30-38.
190.
Id. 44 119-23.
191.
Id. 11122.
192.
Id. IT6.
193.
Id. 1 7.
194.
See generally Jack J. Coe, Jr., Denial of Justice and NAFTA Chapter
Eleven-The Mondev Award, INTL ARB. NEWS 2 (Winter 2002/2003) (ABA SILP
publication).
195.
Through a corporate reorganization, the Canadian corporation had lost the
requisite nationality to fall within the tribunal's jurisdiction; the individual claim of
Ray Loewen failed because he had not demonstrated to the tribunal's satisfaction
ownership or control. For a more complete summary, see supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
196.
In summation the tribunal observed: "the whole trial and its resultant
verdict were clearly improper and discreditable and cannot be squared with minimum
standards of international law and fair and equitable treatment." Loewen, Final
Award, supra note 31,
137.

2003]

INTERNA TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA TION

1423

Supreme Court review obliged the claimants to demonstrate why that
avenue was not among the "reasonably available and adequate" local
remedies, which under the rule a claimant must pursue. 19 7 The
award, which has generated considerable controversy, contains much
of importance.
Interpretive issues aside, the doctrine adopted in Loewen is
somewhat attractive in that before a state will be held responsible for
the acts of judicial organs, the curative mechanisms designed to
redress the type of error complained of will be allowed to function.
Consequently,
the investor will
not-by
ignoring appeal
opportunities-be able to make state responsibility depend upon on
what may be the host state justice system's weakest link. This
concern was at heart of the Loewen tribunal's thinking. It observed:
[I]t would be very strange if a State were to be confronted with liability
for a breach of international law committed by its magistrate or lowranking judicial officer when domestic avenues of appeal were not
198
pursued, let alone exhausted.

The award, however, raises questions about the role of exhaustion
when the claim is not based on judicial conduct. To impose an
exhaustion requirement the tribunal had to find that Article 1121
(requiring waiver of domestic proceedings) did not by implication
supplant the customary doctrine of exhaustion. It may well be true
that Article 1121 is not aimed at the exhaustion requirement
specifically, 199 but within Chapter ll's overall architecture, it is
difficult to see how one can both exhaust local remedies and waive
their initiation or continuance. 200 The tribunal acknowledged that
"Article 1121 may have consequences" for other kinds of claims, but
declined to speculate further. 201 If the exhaustion requirement is not
affected by Article 1121 when judicial acts are involved, why would it
be when they are not? Perhaps the same beneficial finality
requirement applied by the tribunal could have been installed by
insisting that until redress has been pursued at the highest available
levels, justice system acts and omissions are not "measures . . .
' 202
adopted by a Party.

197.
Id. %215. That grants of certiorari are discretionary and infrequent would
not alone excuse the failure to seek such review. Id. 77l1
215-17.
198.
Id. 1 162.
199.
See id. if 161 (relying on agreement between Professors Christopher
Greenwood and Sir Robert Jennings).
200.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1121.
201.
Loewen, Final Award, supra note 31, 7 163.
202.
See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1101. The definition of "measure" however is
very broad, so that this line of reasoning encounters difficulty. Why would a lower
court's handling of a case not fall within "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement
or practice"? See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 201(1).
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Alternatively, but in a similar vein, the "exhaustion"
requirement identified by the tribunal might come to be viewed as a
substantive element specific to denial of justice claims. Thus, just as a
recovery under Article 1110 (expropriation) requires a showing of
permanency of deprivation, so would a denial of justice claim imply
necessarily that appeals had been fully pursued within the legal
system under consideration. Regardless, even though (and perhaps
because) the just-minted Loewen award is both fully dictum on these
points and a bit elliptical, one should expect extensive reaction from
commentators.
6. The Impact of Domestic Court Adjudication
In several of the Chapter 11 expropriation cases, there were preclaim attempts by an investor to pursue local remedies. Often the
findings in domestic courts have been unfavorable to the investor.
While Chapter 11 tribunals are not bound by domestic court
judgments, they have been influenced by those determinations. 20 3
Provided the process below does not rise to the level of a denial of
justice 2 4-itself a violation of Article 1105-domestic courts may be
regarded as shedding persuasive light on the content of domestic law,
as Azinian, the second case filed against Mexico, demonstrates.
Azinian arose from a concession, which the claimant alleged had
been wrongfully terminated or materially breached. 20 5 Mexican
administrative and judicial courts had passed on the concession's
viability, finding it-in essence-to be voidable, because of the
manner in which it was procured. 206 In dismissing Azinian's claim, a
unanimous tribunal credited the domestic court decisions with
establishing the concession's vulnerability as a matter of Mexican
law. 2 0 7 It followed that the municipality in question had merely acted
as it was entitled to given the defective rights the investor held.
There was thus, according to the tribunal, "by definition no contract
'20 8
to be expropriated.
7. Resulting Strategic Considerations
In denial of justice cases, Loewen may take hold among NAFTA
arbitrators so that an investor aggrieved by a court's handling of its

203.

See generally Dodge, Exhaustion, supra note 179; Dodge, Trials, supra note

171.

204.
205.
206.
in seeking
207.
208.

See Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49, T7l115-16, 126-27.
Azinian, Award, supra note 82, T7 17, 75.
Principally, the defects related to misrepresentations made by the investor
the concession. Id. if 21.
Id.
Id. V 100.
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case would at its peril fail to seek appeal at the highest level. If, as
seems likely, Loewen remains limited to denial of justice claims, in
relation to non-justice system measures investors will retain the
choices whether and to what extent to pursue local remedies. How
claimants will react to the present array of factors in making the
choice is difficult to predict. The considerations that inform the
decision to press municipal avenues are as much strategic as
jurisprudential. They also cut both ways.
To recapitulate, if local courts provide a simple remedy, so as to
obviate arbitration, time, money, and other resources may be saved.
Equally, an investor's failure to engage domestic mechanisms of
redress, may be seen by the tribunal as imprudent and contributing
to the investor's losses or business failures. 20 9 Domestic proceedings
however may not advance quickly or cheaply. Preoccupation with
such proceedings moreover will imperil the subsequent NAFTA
arbitration if the investor overlooks the three year limitation period
applicable to Chapter 11 claims. 2 10 The passage of time might also
make critical evidence less available. Further, the results below may
be unfavorable to the investor, and to the extent they define the
investor's rights under domestic law, they may be given persuasive
effect by a Chapter 11 tribunal. Finally, in a Mexican court, reliance
on the NAFTA may be deemed an election of the domestic remedy
over Chapter 11 arbitration, a consequence peculiar to Mexico's
211
implementation of the NAFTA.
E. GoverningLaw Indeterminatenessand Outcome Unpredictability
1. The Stakes: Legitimacy and Efficiency
Thoughtful students of Chapter 11 and of adjudicative systems
in general have rightly stressed the role of determinateness-the
clarity and accessibility of governing law-in establishing and
maintaining system legitimacy. 2 12 In the context of Chapter 11, the
consequences of achieving and maintaining sufficient levels of
determinacy might include increased likelihood of NAFTA-compliant
behavior by host states, greater probability of settlement in the event
of breach, and fewer baseless claims. With these concerns in mind,

See Feldman, Final Award, supra note 31, 114 (stating that the failure to
209.
seek clarification of eligibility for rebates damaging to investor's case).
87 (dismissing claims as time210.
Cf. Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49,
barred under Article 1116).
See NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1120.1.
211.
212.
See Brower, supra note 131, at 66-68 (discussing the perceived amenability
of certain treaty standards to arbitral law-making and consequent potential for
doctrinal incoherence).
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informed observers have identified divergence among Chapter 11
tribunals on questions of procedure and substance.
2. Adopting Reasonable Expectations, Present and Future
One's expectations about clarity and stability of Chapter 11 law
necessarily make assumptions about what can be achieved given its
dependence on custom. Customary international law remains
fragmentary in many respects and its quickening mechanism is
ponderous. 213 Consequently, a realistic appraisal of determinateness
must account for international law's diffuse nature, a trait not
peculiar to its application under Chapter 11. The precision
superimposed on custom by the treaty text is only a partial answer;
the more often relied upon bases of recovery found there, after all,
refer for rules of decision to custom. 2 14 Critically important also is the
recognition that many of the tests for determining responsibility are
highly fact-dependent and it is often misleading to explain differing
outcomes by emphasizing apparent variations in the juridical
language used, rather than by reference to distinguishable facts.
3. Formal Mechanisms: The Role of Binding Interpretations
a. In General
As noted above, the NAFTA drafters anticipated unacceptable
departures from intended meaning by retaining in themselves the
prerogative of conclusively interpreting the text. 2 15 That entitlement
is exercised through the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), essentially
comprising members of the three trade ministries. 216 The governing
law mandate to which Chapter 11 arbitrators are subject therefore
carries the prospect that the controlling text will acquire-at any
given point-a gloss which may be different from that they would
discover on their own. In theory, the disruptiveness of FTC
interpretations should be no greater than when a governing statute is
amended-an
occurrence
standing
judges
face
regularly.
Conceptually, interpretations merely describe what has been
NAFTA's content from its inception, and ordinarily ought to take
effect immediately. The situation becomes more complex when
counsel, academics, and arbitrators raise genuine doubts about a

213.
214.
215.
216.

See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 157, at 4-11.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
See id.
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note's validity, 2 17 a predictable turn of events when the note, rather
than confirming generous exposure to responsibility, arguably
contracts that exposure. 218 Indeed, the cynic will readily note that
thus far the three governments have only been stirred to action by
readings of their obligations perceived by them to be unduly broad.
The catalyst for what proved to be an important episode in Chapter
li's development was Article 1105.
b. The Article 1105 Example
Hindsight reveals that certain of Chapter l's provisions, on the
day they took effect, had more promise than substantive clarity. As a
review of the literature readily confirms, Article 1105 has been
singular in generating confusion and controversy. 2 19 Its guarantee of
treatment "in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment . . ." corresponds to similar provisions found in
hundreds of BITs. 220 Despite the pre-NAFTA prevalence of the fair
and equitable treatment formula, Chapter 11 arbitration appears to
have presented the first opportunity for authoritative construction of
that clause. In particular, with seemingly every claimant relying on
Article 1105, the meaning of "international law" and "including" soon
became hotly contested.
The fundamental points of divergence related to whether, for
purposes of Article 1105, "international law" merely meant custom, or
whether the full catalog of sources listed, e.g., in the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) could be consulted. 221 The closely
related problem posed by "including" was whether the fair-andequitable-treatment clause added to the international minimum
standard a treaty guarantee assimilating the ordinary meaning of
"fair" and of "equitable" or whether the clause simply illustrates one
or more of the elements contained in the minimum standard

217.
For more on the distinction between amendment and interpretation, see
Brower, supra note 135, at 50, 65. For discussion by a Chapter 11 tribunal, see Pope &
Talbot, Award on Damages, supra note 79, 11 105-18.
218.
In Pope & Talbot the validity question was linked to whether a finding of
liability should be reassessed in light of a subsequent Note arguably presenting a
different interpretation than that supporting the award. See Pope & Talbot, Award on
Damages, supra note 79, 11 105-18, infra note 231 and accompanying text. See
generally J. Christopher Thomas, Reflections on Article 1105 of NAFTA: History, State
Practice and the Influence of Commentators, 17 ICSID REV. 21, 98-101 (2002).
219.
See generally Brower, supra note 131, at 66-68; Thomas, supra note 218.
220.
See Brower et al., supra note 55, at 17-19.
221.
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists not only custom but treaties and general
principles of law recognized by developed legal systems, sources discussed in detail in
the standard references. See BROWNLIE, supra note 157, ch. 1.
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established by custom. 222 The distinction matters because if custom
circumscribes all of Article 1105, a claimant would be required to go
beyond ordinary meaning to satisfy the possibly more rigorous tests
attributed to custom. 22 3 Perhaps not surprisingly, Chapter 11
tribunals adopted differing views on Article 1105's meaning and
application.224
If, as has come to be the prevailing view, Article 1105 is part of a
bundle of protections contained in the minimum standard, the further
question arises whether that cluster of customary protections
overlaps with guarantees found elsewhere in Chapter 11, such as that
requiring national treatment (Article 1102). The question would
remain somewhat academic but for the Myers award on liability, in
which tribunal (by a majority) found an overlap between Articles
1102 and 1105 and truncated its Article 1105 analysis accordingly;
that is, it derived a breach of Article 1105 from a breach of Article
1102 analyzing the latter's national treatment provision but
discussing 1105 only briefly. 225 For the two arbitrators forming the
award, "the fact that a host [state] has breached a rule of
international law that is specifically designed to protect investors will
''
tend to weigh heavily in favour of finding a breach of Article 1105. 226

222.
At the time of Metalclad,few commentaries shed light on Article 1105 or its
predecessor formulae. Among them was F.A. Mann, whose essay in British Yearbook of
International Law was embraced by claimants with considerable enthusiasm. In
discussing the fair and equitable clause in certain British BITs, Mann wrote:
[W]hile it may be suggested that arbitrary, discriminatory or abusive treatment
is contrary to customary international law, unfair and inequitable treatment is
a much wider conception which may readily include such administrative
measures ...as are not plainly illegal in the accepted sense of international
law.
F.A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protectionof Investments, 1981 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 241, 243, reprinted in F.A. MANN, FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 234,237 (1990).
For Mann it was clear that fair and equitable treatment was not merely a
restatement of the minimum standard, or simply one component of it, but extended "far
beyond the minimum standard." Id. at 237-38. The provision Mann was construing
however-like the majority of BITs-made no mention of international law in
connection with fair and equitable treatment. See Brower et al., supra note 55, at 17.
Whereas Article 1105 refers to "treatment in accordance with international law
including fair and equitable treatment" (emphasis added). NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
1105(1). The most natural literal import of that language is that international law
includes a fairness component, not that fairness is an augmenting treaty obligation
added to the dictates of the international minimum standard. Yet, for disputants, a
failure of authorities to provide distinct customary parameters to the concept "fair and
equitable treatment" left a vacuum, filled by ordinary meaning. For thoughtful
discussion of this and related problems by one of Mexico's counsel, see generally
Thomas, Reflections, supra note 216.
223.
See Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49,
120-23, 127.
224.
See generally Brower et al., supra note 55.
225.
S.D. Myers, Award on Merits, supra note 31,
258-66.
226.
Id. 264.
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Though the tribunal acknowledged that this double effect is not
always the case, under the facts presented "the breach of Article 1102
essentially establish[ed] a breach of 1105 as well. '227 This mode of
analysis as well as the scope of Article 1105 was subsequently
addressed jointly by the NAFTA states, through its Interpretive Note.
b. The Interpretive Note
In July 31, 2001, NAFTA's Free Trade Commission (FTC) issued
a statement (the Interpretive Note) declaring that Article 1105 was
no more encompassing than the minimum standard of treatment
known in custom and that a breach of one Chapter 11 provision or of
another treaty does not establish necessarily the breach of Article
1105(1).228

The instrument generated divergent-and sometimes

29
spirited-views among Chapter 11 tribunals and commentators,
who debated whether the Interpretive Note constitutes an ultra vires
act, to be ignored accordingly.2 30 The trend seems to be toward giving
it legitimacy on one basis or another, and at least two tribunals have
declined opportunities to resolve all the questions raised by 1105 and
the Interpretive Note. 231 The distinguished tribunal in Mondev,
demonstrating the way forward, attributed to the Note a reasonable
construction, which in turn diminished perceptions of NAFTA
government over-reaching.
It confirmed that Article 1105

227.
Id. 1 266. The tribunal cited F. A. Mann for the observation that the fair
and equitable treatment as an overriding duty may be sufficiently broad to encompass
many of the specific protections contained in BITs. Id. 7 265.
228.
In pertinent part, the Note states under the heading 'Minimum Standard
of Treatment in Accordance with International Law":
1.
Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be
afforded to investments of investors of another Party.
2.
The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens.
3.
A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the
NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there
has been a breach of Article 1105(1).
Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 provisions, July 31, 2001, § B, available
at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2003).
229.
See generally Brower, supra note 135; Thomas, Reply to Professor Brower,
supra note 43; Brower, Reply to Mr. Thomas, supra note 143.
230.
See ADF, Award, supra note 40, 7791
109-25 (recounting of copious filings
before it on the subject).
231.
Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49, $ 125; ADF, Award, supra note 40,
7 186.
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encompasses modern custom, as distinct from the less evolved and
less protective customary law of alien protection that prevailed closer
to the turn of the last century. At the same time it did not question
the viability of the Note in general. 232 Subsequent tribunals have
expressed views largely concordant with those enunciated in
233
Mondev.
4. Article 1110: Unremarkable or Untidy?
a. Apparent Divergence
Compared to the principle of fair and equitable treatmentwhich arguably was applied for the first time in Metalclad-well
before NAFTA, the question of expropriation had been the subject of
copious literature and dozens of reported decisions. By 1994, the
volumes reporting the awards of the Iran-U.S. Claims tribunal alone
numbered about twenty-seven. 234 Several awards, ad hoc and ICSIDadministered, dealing with expropriation could be found in the
23 5
published reports and much learned commentary graced the field.
Given the body of accessible precedent, one could be forgiven for

expecting relatively immediate

unity as Chapter

11

tribunals

confronted Article 1110.

232.
Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49,
120-25. With respect to the FTC
Note, the Mondev tribunal found nothing implausible in excluding from Article 1105
extraneous treaty obligations among the Parties and in rejecting that fair and
equitable treatments are something more than elements among a cluster of protections
constituting the international minimum standard (the text referring after all to them
as "included"). Yet, it also declined to tether Article 1105 to 19th Century custom,
reasoning rather that the custom referred to must be of a modern and evolving sort.
233.
The difference in approach to the FTC Note between Pope & Talbot and the
subsequent Mondev and ADF tribunals is marked. The former's Award on Damages,
Pope & Talbot, Award on Damages, supra note 79, intimated in dictum that it regarded
the Note as probably an amendment, not a mere interpretation, so that if it was
required to, it would proceed without giving the Note binding effect. Id.
47. In
response, all three NAFTA governments seized their first opportunity to attack that
view. Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49, 1 110. Ultimately, the Pope & Talbot
tribunal confirmed the pre-Note result it had reached in its earlier award after
proceeding, arguendo, as if the Note governed and attributing to it the strictest
approach offered it-that of the Respondent. Pope & Talbot, Award on Damages, supra
note 79, 68.
234.
Cf. George Aldrich, What Constitutes Compensable Taking of Property? The
Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (1994)
(distilling Tribunal decisional law on expropriation and citing from Vol. 27 of the
Tribunal Reporter).
235.
See generally Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent
Developments in InternationalLaw, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259 (1982). Some writers
and arbitrators distinguish terminologically between property "interference" and
property "deprivation," only the latter being compensable. See Brower, supra note 120,
at 68-71. The distinction is not uniformly observed.
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Nevertheless, early in the development of the Chapter 11 docket,
there surfaced apparent differences in tribunal approaches to what
constitutes a taking-the essential finding that triggers the duty to
compensate under Article 1110.236 In particular, the extent to which
regulation might be an indirect taking seemed to produce diffuse, and
arguably conflicting, guidance. There is, in certain awards, dictum
suggesting that not every business disruption attributable in some
fashion to host state regulation constitutes a taking and that
governmental regulatory imperatives ought not to be subjected to a
hair-trigger breach threshold. 237 These passages might be juxtaposed
with the oft-quoted language in the Metalclad award, which states
that "covert and incidental interference" which deprives the property
owner "insignificant part" of its "reasonably-to-be expected economic
benefit" can constitute a taking. 238 The sense of divergence is
amplified by Metalclad's result-an award of compensation under
Article 1110-and the opposite results in all other Chapter 11
239
cases.
b. A Second Look
Language of course matters, and as proof that an appellate
mechanism is needed for Chapter 11 awards, the above comparisons
of language and results may offer a prima facie case. 240 It is
nevertheless too soon to classify the law of Article 1110 as being in
hopeless disarray. Bearing in mind Article 1110's dependency on the
underlying custom and the fact-intensive nature of expropriation
analysis, a measure of untidiness is fully to be expected.
With respect to Chapter 11, the apparent differences in approach
may be merely cautionary framing designed to reiterate what is
settled doctrine-that regulatory impairment of investment activities
does not invariably constitute a taking and that what is required is
substantial, permanent deprivation, caused by acts attributable to
the host state, rather than to the investor. Indeed, little appears to
have changed since then-Professor Rosalyn Higgins gave her first
Hague Academy lecturers 241 suggesting that-at least as to physical

236. See Dodge, supra note 171, at 576.
112 (paraphrasing
237.
See, e.g., Feldman, Final Award, supra note 31,
83) ("not all government regulatory activity [thwarting a
Azinian, supra note 82,
281
particular business plan] is an expropriation"); Myers, Award, supra note 31,
(regulatory action not usually a taking).
103.
238.
Metalclad, Award, supra note 41,
239.

See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 476-80 (John

H. Jackson ed., 2002) (comparing several Chapter 11 expropriation cases including
Metalclad).
240.
See Dodge, supra note 57, at 918 (raising need for appellate body for
Chapter 11 awards).
241.
Higgins, supra note 235.
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property-the substantiality of the interference suffered is at the
heart of the matter. 242 Myers, for instance, was decided on the basis
that the interference in question was not permanent, a rationale that
the Metalclad tribunal certainly would have adopted as a matter of
first principles. Nor is it certain that the Metalclad tribunal would
have reached different results from those of the Pope & Talbot or
Feldman tribunals. In those cases, quite plausibly the Metalclad
tribunal would have concluded that (in the words of that tribunal) the
investor had not been deprived "in significant part" of its "reasonablyto-be-expected economic benefit. '243 Indeed, the Feldman tribunal's
approach in particular, which stressed that most of the investor's
export activities remained undisturbed, seems not radically different
from the Metalclad method. 244 Both tribunals looked to degree of
interference, with Metalclad-a case of complete, permanent de facto
taking 24 5-simply
being at a different end of the interference
continuum from Feldman.24 6 Importantly, though often expressing
various levels of discomfort with the notion that health and safety
regulation might oblige a state to compensate, no tribunal has
announced an outright exemption for regulatory takings; in fact, such
247
a broad exception has been openly rejected.
5. Tentative Conclusions on the Question of Indeterminacy
One's satisfaction with the levels of principled guidance achieved
within Chapter 11 jurisprudence, of course, depends upon the
standard one adopts. If the test is whether the process is leading to
identifiable doctrine largely defensible in light of the controlling text
and law, Chapter 11 has functioned reasonably well. After merely
half a decade of docket activity, relative certainty has been achieved
about many questions that were untested in 1994. Indeed, a number
248
of trend positions can be identified: NAFTA is not retroactive;
standard rules of treaty interpretation govern the process (there is no
pro-sovereignty presumption); 249 substance is generally more
important than form (especially in relation to procedural questions

242.
Id. at 324.
243.
See generally Feldman, Final Award, supra note 31; Pope & Talbot, Award
in Respect of Damages, supra note 79.
244.
Feldman, Final Award, supranote 31, IT152.
245.
Id. 1 148 (Metalclad deprived of all beneficial use, unlike instant claimant).
246.
See also Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (June 26, 2000), IT 102,
available at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2003) (test is degree of
interference with investment's operation).
247.
See id. 1 99; Feldman, Final Award, supra note 31, Jill 102, 110; S.D.
Myers, Award on Merits, supra note 31, Schwartz Sep. Op., 7 206, 217.
248.
See Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49, 170.
249.
See id. 1 43.
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affecting the claim); 250 Article 1105 is circumscribed by modern
custom (which includes fairness elements); 251 the customary law of
taking is neither made more encompassing 25 2 by Article 1110 nor
subject to a blanket regulatory exception; 253 denial of justice is a
viable theory of recovery under Article 1105, and the underlying test
is strict 254 but not as strict as that enunciated in the inter-war
years; 2 55 neither respondents nor claimants should take recovery of
costs for granted, 256 but Chapter 11 awards will carry interest, at a
257
rate set in the tribunal's discretion.
Even if excused as being merely a partial list, the forgoing
collection of broad propositions may seem like a modest haul. Careful
observers of Chapter 11 jurisprudence, moreover, will be able to
construct an equally long list of unresolved questions or divergent
approaches, 25 8 These inevitable consequences of decentralization do
not alter the fact that there is a process at work that is reasonably
effective in rejecting untenable extremes and in confirming and
synthesizing principles incrementally. It is a vibrant, if occasionally
erratic, process sustained in part by a vigilant NAFTA bar and
fiercely independent arbitrators; far from being dispiriting-the
docket thus far ought to inspire confidence in the combination of
formal and informal mechanisms at work. Whether, nonetheless,
these serviceable mechanisms might benefit from centralized
oversight is considered under Section VI below.

250.
See Ethyl Corp., Award on Jurisdiction, supranote 4, 7 91.
251.
See Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49, 77 123-25; ADF, Award, supra
note 40, 191 185-86.
Certain claimants had unsuccessfully argued that the Article 1110 phrase
252.
or a measure tantamount to . . . expropriation" extends beyond customary limits the
scope of compensable property interference. See S.D. Myers, Award on Merits, supra
note 31, 7 285; Pope & Talbot, Interim Award, supra note 243, 77 84-96.
See infra tbl. 4.
253.
254.
See Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49, 1 127.
255.
See id. 1 123.
256.
See infra tbl. 4.
257.
Interest formulae designated by Chapter Eleven tribunals have been
diverse. The not-unprecedented practice of awarding compounding interest was
followed in Pope & Talbot, where the tribunal in both its damages and costs awards
affixed "5% per annum compounded quarterly and pro rata within a quarter." Pope &
Talbot, Award on Damages, supra note 79, 7190; Pope & Talbot, Award on Costs, supra
note 81, 1 18. By contrast, the Feldman award of nearly seventeen million pesos
carried simple interest "to be calculated ... for each month of the period of calculation
at a rate equivalent to the yield for the month, of the Federal Treasury Certificates,
issued by the Mexican Government, with a maturity of 28 days." Feldman, Award,
supra note 32, 1 211. See William W. Park, Andrea K. Bjorklund, & Jack J. Coe, Jr.,
Year in Review: InternationalArbitration,37 INT'L LAW 445, 456 (2003).
258.
The advent of Loewen, see supra notes 188-199 and accompanying text,
would appear to move the exhaustion question to the head of the list, given that the
Mondev tribunal, equally in reference to a denial of justice claim, regarded exhaustion
as an "option" (not a requirement). Mondev, Final Award, supra note 49, 1 126.
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F. Lack of Process Transparency
1. Policy Underpinnings and Expectations
Transparency means different things to different people. In a
world of televised judicial confirmation proceedings, cameras in the
courtroom, proliferating television judges, and entire networks
dedicated to tracking judicial proceedings, Chapter 11 arbitration
may seem sorely lacking. The appointment of Chapter 11 arbitrators
results from a largely private process, members of the public are not
ordinarily invited to witness the hearings and are not privy to the
deliberative processes of the arbitrators, who remain free to choose
how much extraneous information to include in their written awards
and how to frame the material disclosed.
In the abstract, these restrictions might seem to undermine
legitimate policies favoring openness. Certainly the public has a
legitimate interest in knowing most promptly what its government
has done-for good or for ill-to generate the claim; press releases
authored by disputants are a poor substitute for raw data exposed in
real time, in the context of an adversarial exchange. So too would
legitimacy of the process and result be enhanced if the rigor and care
attending Chapter 11 proceedings were open to public scrutiny and
indeed if some mechanism were in place to regulate arbitrators and
sanction those who serve badly. As is evident in certain popular
documentaries on Chapter 11, however, exaggeration on these points
is too easily accomplished 259 and competing interests too easily
ignored.
2. Comparative Transparency
Transparency and related system attributes can only be
measured in degrees and as a matter of perspective. For the
international lawyer accustomed to international commercial
arbitration, Chapter 11 proceedings may be discomforting in their
openness. An ICC arbitration between two private enterprises, for
instance, may run its course with the mere fact of the dispute never

259.
See, e.g., Anthony De Palma, NAFTA's Powerful Little Secret: Obscure
Tribunals Settle Disputes, But Go Too Far Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, § 3,
at 1 (describing investor-state arbitral process as a form of "secret government" from
the point of view of one public interest activist); cf. Carbonneau, supra note 140, at 82629 (regarding ill-informed and misleading critiques of Chapter 11). A different form of
transparency deficiency that some observers emphasize is the lack of an open
democratic process leading to trade obligations; for these critics, the process ought to
afford interested groups an opportunity to comment and to galvanize opposition to
perceived imbalances. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 145, n.482 and accompanying
text.
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being publicly disclosed. 260 Hearings thus are highly private matters
and the resulting award, if published at all, will often be redacted to
obscure the identity of the parties. 261 Even limited participation in
the proceedings by non-party interveners or amici would be
extraordinary. Similarly, the level of interest in a vacatur action
would ordinarily not merit streaming video transmissions from the
262
courtroom, as happened in the Metalclad set aside proceeding.
By contrast, with rare exception, Chapter 11 pleadings,
procedural orders, and awards now become available seasonably.
During the proceedings, disputant attempts before NAFTA tribunals
to enforce expectations of confidentiality (as distinct from privacy)
have met with only tepid success; 263 the FTC's Interpretive Note, in
turn, helped galvanize this trend and confirmed the parties' own
2 64
commitment to liberal disclosure.

260.
See W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 311-12 (3d ed. 2000).
261.
See COE, supra note 28, at 86-87, 262-63.
262.
See Thomas, Reply to ProfessorBrower, supra note 43, at 457 n.95.
263.
The Metalclad tribunal ruled that under the circumstances before it, the
disputants were not under a duty to refrain from disclosing details of their arbitration.
The question was raised by Mexico, which sought an order preventing claimant from
discussing the case with non-participants, such as shareholders and the press. Long
before the case was filed, telephone conferences with shareholders had become a
common practice for Metalclad and the practice continued. Mexico maintained that
matters under consideration before the tribunal were confidential. Metalclad rejected
any obligation of confidentiality, relying on the absence of any formal agreement on the
subject, Mexico's own conduct in apparent contravention of the supposed rule and its
obligations of disclosure as a public company. The tribunal declined to issue the order
that Mexico sought, but expressed the view that limiting public discussion of the case
to a minimum would facilitate the orderly unfolding of the proceedings and enhance
working relations between the parties.
264.
In pertinent part, the Note states:
Nothing in the NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the
disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbitration, and, subject to the
application of Article 1137(4), nothing in the NAFTA precludes the Parties
from providing public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a
Chapter Eleven tribunal ....
Each Party agrees to make available to the public
in a timely manner all documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven
tribunal, subject to redaction of: confidential business information; information
which is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under the Party's
domestic law; and information which the Party must withhold pursuant to the
relevant arbitral rules, as applied.
The Parties reaffirm that disputing parties may disclose to other persons in
connection with the arbitral proceedings such unredacted documents as they
consider necessary for the preparation of their cases, but they shall ensure that
those persons protect the confidential information in such documents. The
Parties further reaffirm that the Governments of Canada, the United Mexican
States and the United States of America may share with officials of their
respective federal, state or provincial governments all relevant documents in
the course of dispute settlement under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, including
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The two NAFTA tribunals that have allowed amicus
participation on a limited basis 265 have set precedent likely to be
followed. One NAFTA proceeding, moreover, has been opened to the
public, though only with the consent of the parties. 266 While such
closed circuit broadcasts cannot yet be said to be the norm, other
mechanisms within the Chapter 11 architecture are partial proxies
for unbridled public access. In particular, because representatives of
the two NAFTA states not party to the dispute typically attend the
proceedings and, as noted above, are entitled receive the associated
filings and to make submissions on questions of NAFTA
interpretation, extravagant and fanciful theories of recovery or
defenses do not escape notice.
G. Lack of TribunalAccountability
1. The Complaint
Critics of Chapter 11 are often ill-at-ease with what appears to
be arbitrator autonomy unrestrained by the professional and
constitutional strictures associated with judges. 26 7 Despite the
theoretical independence of arbitrators, once functus officio, they
return to their full-time posts and-so goes the argument-cannot be
made to account for the wake they leave behind. Moreover, they areor hope to be-repeat players; their dependence on private
appointments may exert various influences on them, influences to
which judges are not susceptible. Additionally, many of them are
cross-over players, serving as arbitrator in one case and as advocate
in another, later using the fact of one role to promote appointments to
the other.

confidential information. The Parties confirm that nothing in this
interpretation shall be construed to require any Party to furnish or allow access
to information that it may withhold in accordance with Articles 2102 or 2105.
Notes of interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, July 31, 2001, § A, available
at http://www.naftaclaims.comPapers/July/ 2031%202001%20NAFTA%20FTC%2OState
ment.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2003) (paragraphing deleted).
265.
See Methanex v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for
Third Persons to Intervene as "Amici Curiae", supra note 37. The UPS v. Canada
tribunal, in principle, also authorized limited, written submissions, subject to strictures
to be established in consultation with the disputants. See United Parcel Service of Am.,
Inc. v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37.
266.
See ICSID Press Release, available at http://www.worldbankl.org (last
visited Sept. 11, 2003).
267.
See Brower, supra note 131, at 70 and accompanying footnotes.
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2. A Partial Reply
To compare Chapter 11 arbitrators to judges appointed under a
domestic constitution would seem to miss the point. Arbitrator
detachment is one of the central features that perpetuates
arbitration's popularity in international trade. 268 In a given case, an
arbitral tribunal may well pursue a far more objective process than
that available in the otherwise available local court, where myriad
pressures may exert subtle and not so subtle influences. What is
more, arbitrators have more accountability than may be apparent.
The seemingly instant and wide availability of their reasoned awards
and the specter of dissenting opinions encourage care and
thoroughness. That many arbitrators hope for further appointments
would tend to promote, not discourage judiciousness; the arbitration
bar is in general very attentive to such matters and arbitral
appointments are often facilitated or thwarted by word-of-mouth
information gathering. Additionally, whichever review format
obtains, some formal mechanism is always in place to nullify awards
reflecting most true excesses. When vacatur occurs, the award's
flaws-and by extension, the arbitrators' missteps-are typically
made public, further discouraging ill-considered awards.
The kind of institutional accountability desired by certain critics
more plausibly would result from a standing body to replace the
present system of single arbitration appointments, though as
discussed below, there are reasons to resist a first instance organ of
this type. 269 The related question of instituting such a panel as an
2 70
appellate organ is also considered below.
H. Chilling Effect on Beneficial Regulation
1. The Fear
In the Methanex case, arising out of California's decision to
gradually eliminate MTBE from gasoline, the claimant reportedly
seeks $970 million in damages. 2 71 For certain critics of Chapter 11,

268.
For some this may beg an essential question, since unlike some writers, I
do not find investor-state arbitration sufficiently different from its private counterpart
for wholly different considerations to obtain. Many of the same attributes and factors
that make arbitration attractive in private trade also commend its use in the mixed
setting.
269.
See infra part 5.H and accompanying notes.
270.
See infra notes 293-309 and accompanying text.
271.
See Evelyn Iritani, Ban on MTBE Induces Suit Using NAFTA Provision,
L.A. TIMES, Feb.6, 2002, at C1.
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the case exemplifies much of what is disturbing about it. 272 One
understandable concern is that the specter of ruinous liability might
restrain lawmakers from acting in the public interest. The
apprehension has been sufficiently well communicated that tribunals
have announced their appreciation for its relevance and gravity. The
claimants, in response, have naturally emphasized the chill on
investment flows that would result if redress becomes illusive or
2 73
under-compensation becomes the norm.
2. The Interim Data
The staggering numbers accompanying the Chapter 11 prayers
for relief, though making for sensational headlines, are misleading.
The specter of chilling effect is more accurately assessed by
considering net damages awarded rather than damages sought.
Approximately fifteen Chapter 11 cases have come to a conclusion.
Two have settled, five seem to have been abandoned by the claimants,
and eight have reached an adjudicated outcome. 274 Only Metalclad
and Myers have ended in awards of arguably significant
compensation. In Metalclad, the recovery (approximately $17 million)
constituted less than 20 percent of what the claimant sought, left the
claimant to pay its own costs (estimated to be approximately $4
million) and was conditioned on transference to Mexico of title to the
investment (comprising a ready-to-operate landfill). The claimant's
recovery, moreover, was delayed, and ultimately somewhat reduced,
through post-award proceedings in a domestic court; the investor's
additional costs of defending the award in those proceedings were not
awarded by the trial court. 2 75 S.D. Myers' $6 million (Can.) recovery,
presently being contested in a Canadian court, 276 has similarly hollow
277
features.

272.
Cf. S.D. Myers, Award on Merits, supra note 31, Schwartz Sep. Op.
203
(critics warn "[flear of liability may cause governments to shy away from bold
regulatory action in the interests of health . . ').See generally William T. Warren,
Paying to Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v. United States and NAFTA Investor Rights,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10986 (2001).
273.
See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Award On Merits, supra note 31, Schwartz Sep. Op.,
85-86 (separate opinion discussing contention that certain Chapter 11 claims
challenge "the practical ability of governmental authorities to protect health and the
environment") and contrast Metalclad v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Claimant's
Reply, 1 531 (rules of compensation should not make "a non-sense of foreign
investment") (Reply Brief on file with author).
274.
See supra for discussion of Azinian, Mondev, ADF and Lowen, for example.
275.
See Metalclad, Reasons for Judgment of Hon. Mr. Justice Tysoe, supra note
43.
276.
For a description of S.D. Myers, see infra note 282 and accompanying text.
277.
Myers had sought $20 million, a request moderated no doubt by its
knowledge that expropriation had been ruled out by the tribunal's earlier award. It did
receive costs, but those awarded were substantially less than $1 million.
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In Azinian, Mondev, ADF and Loewen, after costly proceedings,
the respective claimants recovered nothing, while having to bear their
own costs.2 78 Waste Management, moreover, was made to initiate its
claim afresh after its first effort was dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds. As to Methanex, though pending, it is not clear that the
claim will enjoy success; it would appear that a recent jurisdictional
ruling has lessened the claimant's odds of recovering. 279 In Ethyl,
Canada settled for $13 million, perhaps shielding itself from a greater
award and appreciable costs. Relatively small recoveries were
granted in Pope & Talbot and Feldman.280 Taken as a whole, these
results should do little to embolden potential claimants or to restrain
regulators.
I. The Perceptionof Alien Advantage
1. Dual Systems
The autonomy maintained between domestic and international
legal systems, though by no means a characteristic inaugurated with
NAFTA, has become a point of contention among some stakeholders.
It is inherent in the notion of an international minimum standard for
example that treatment accorded nationals of the host state may not
discharge a state's obligations when extended to aliens. Similarly, the
possibly more compensatory regime governing expropriation in
comparison to domestic takings law means that an alien might be
entitled to compensation under NAFTA when a host state citizen
would not be. 28 ' The resulting potential for disparate standards to be
applied to competing enterprise groups is readily appreciated beyond
282
the ranks of international law specialists.

278.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
279.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text. When reformulating its case,
Methanex must show a closer link between the ban complained of and its investment;
merely demonstrating a causal connection between the ban and the injury to the
investment will not suffice to demonstrate that the measure "related to" the
investment. See Methanex, Preliminary Award, supra note 52,
138-39, 147, 159
(discussing the need for a "legally significant connection" between the measure and the
investment), available at http://www.naftalaw.org (last visited Sept. 11, 2003).
280.
See infra tbl. 4. Note also that Feldman is under review by a Canadian
court. See http://www.naftalaw.org.
281.
See Been & Beauvais, supra note 145, at nn.489-90 and accompanying text
("clearest cost" is competitive advantage for foreign firms).
282.
In broaching their misgivings, Been & Beauvais summarize as follows:
[IWf our concerns about what the early tribunals' interpretations of the NAFTA
expropriation provision foreshadow are realized, and NAFTA thereby becomes
more expansive than U.S. takings law, there will be significant costs: Article
1110 will provide foreign investors with competitive advantages over domestic
investors, may deter efficient regulation, and may alter the balance of power
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2. Potential Consequences of the Perception
a. Business Planning
Just as business plans are often ordered with tax considerations
and similar considerations in mind, the apparent advantages of
operating in one NAFTA country while being deemed an investor of
another may well influence places of incorporation and related
matters. In a given context, moreover, those interacting with
regulators on behalf of businesses may search for a "NAFTA

connection"-such as foreign ownership-on the off-chance that a
measure of regulatory forbearance might be exercised in the client's
28 3
favor.

b. Legislative Responses
Proponents of the international minimum standard no doubt
envision that it may often have an elevating effect on domestic
standards. The two systems, of course, might be brought into
uniformity in other ways, such as by eliminating the international
standard altogether or by declaring that the two are synonymous for
all domestic purposes. 284 On the international plane, either of these
would require an amendment to the NAFTA and a NAFTA Party's
unilateral eradication of the minimum standard doctrine within its
municipal system would rightly prompt a Chapter 20 arbitration.

between federal, state, and local governments. Alternatively, the NAFTA
decisions may have a "ratchet" effect, forcing U.S. regulatory takings law to
expand as well.
Id. nn.28-31 (footnotes omitted).
283.
The author has encountered practitioners espousing this strategy as a
method for enhancing bargaining power in dealing with regulatory proceedings in
which discretion plays a role.
284.
U.S. lawmakers have attempted to attach such a limitation on future trade
compacts. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3801; Pub. L. No.
107-210, 116 Stat. 993 (2002). In pertinent part, § 2102 (b)(3) (Trade Negotiating
Objectives) states:
Recognizing that United States law as a whole provides a high level of
protection for investment ... the principal negotiating objectives of the United
States regarding foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or
trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign
investors, in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with
respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United
States. (emphasis added)
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the FTAA might be so limited, an
From inception, of course,
28 5
appreciable regression.

VI. CONTROL MECHANISMS

A. The Existing Control Patchwork
As noted above, neither Canada nor Mexico is a party to the
ICSID Convention. 28 6 Despite an architecture that contemplates
eventual access to ICSID arbitration, proceedings brought during
Chapter 1l's first decade have therefore been confined to the default
formats not dependent on the involvement of two ICSID parties. For
the prospective U.S. claimant, the choice thus has been not a function
of which post-award regime was desired, but rather which rule set
was preferred (UNCITRAL or Additional Facility) and whether
administered arbitration was called for. The manner in which awards
might be attacked did not depend on the choice of format. When one
more NAFTA state ratifies the Convention, there will be three

Similarly, unlike the NAFTA, the FTAA and future BITs, might carve out
285.
an exception for "regulatory" takings. The task was one NAFTA's drafters
contemplated and rejected given its difficulty. See Daniel Price, NAFTA Chapter 11Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve, 6 U.S. CANADA L.J. 1,
2 (2001). Fashioning an exception that is too broad would authorize uncompensated
taking to a far greater degree than may be desirable, such as if the host state is merely
required to identify a plausible "health" or "safety" rationale-labels that are
sufficiently elastic to invite abuse; exempting too few instances defeats the purpose; for
example, requiring proof that substantial damage has already been done, and that no
less-disruptive means was available, might discourage robust protective measures
seasonably implemented. That any exception should require non-discrimination seems
uncontroversial, but even that predicate may be challenging to apply, for example,
when the foreign investor occupies the entire field or is otherwise the only enterprise
damaged under the facts at hand. See, e.g., S.D. Myers, Award on Merits, supra note 31
(export ban only impacted claimant; local processors did not export material); see also
Metalclad, Award, supra note 41 J l 109-12, and correspondence on file with the author
(apparently only Metalclad's facility encompassed by ecology zone).
An attempt to establish a bias against regulatory takings is found in the Draft
U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 7, 2003 version), which carries an
expropriation provision (Article 15.6) that replicates-though with more simplicitythe central features of Article 1110. It is, however, subject to a letter of
understanding-also in draft-that addresses regulatory takings as follows:
Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives,
such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect
expropriations.
Draft Letter of March 7, 2003 Confirming Understanding on Article 15. 6(1) DraftU.S. Free Trade Agreement, available at http://www.ustr.gov (last visited Sept. 11,
2003).
286.
See discussion infra Section VI.H.
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possibilities; one will be anational arbitration, in which domestic
courts are largely supplanted.
B. Meager Data
To date, three Chapter 11 awards have been subject to set aside
proceedings, those issuing from the Metalclad, S.D. Myers and
Feldman tribunals. Each award found breaches of Chapter 11. Each
set-aside action was lodged in a Canadian court by the respective
respondent states. Metalclad led to a carefully reasoned decision
partially setting aside the final award, though largely sustaining the
monetary obligation the award carried. 287 After the trial court's setaside ruling, Metalclad and Mexico settled; appellate level review
therefore was not had. The Myers and Feldman proceedings are
28 8
pending.
Given these limited instances, what follows is only a tentative
assessment of NAFTA's present reliance on domestic courts. Along
with some desirable characteristics, numerous potential flaws will
also be noted. 289 The interim conclusion I reach is that an appellate
body would be preferable to the present mechanism, provided that
body possesses certain attributes, as outlined below.

287.
See supra note 57, infra note 288 and accompanying text.
288.
S.D. Myers, Inc. (SDMI), a company based in Ohio was a prominent
operator of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) disposal facilities in the United States. It
planned to process, in Ohio, PCB waste that had accumulated in Canada, thereby
exploiting competitive advantages it enjoyed. After the U.S. EPA had granted SDMI
permission to import PCB waste, Canada's Minister of the Environment prohibited
export of PCB waste. The border remained closed to PCB exports until February 1997.
In October 1998, SDMI submitted a Chapter 11 claim, alleging breaches, inter alia,
of Articles 1102 (national treatment) and 1105 (international minimum standard
including fair and equitable treatment). SDMI succeeded, receiving in its favor a
partial award on the merits. In finding a violation of Canada's "treatment no less
favorable" undertaking, the tribunal reasoned that Article 1102's "in like
circumstances" qualification invited consideration of the measure in relation to the
Canadian operators in claimant's sector to assess whether its practical effect was to
give a disproportionate benefit to them in relation to non-nationals, whether the
measure's animus was protectionism, and whether any legitimate purposes that were
served by the measure could have been achieved by means more consonant with the
NAFTA.
The tribunal found that the government primarily sought to ensure that Canadian
PCB waste would be processed in Canada, by Canadians, rather than to mitigate an
environmental risk. Though the measure had a legitimate secondary aim-preserving
an intra-Canada capacity to process PCB waste-that aim could have been furthered
by measures consistent with NAFTA. The tribunal's more controversial ruling related
to Article 1105. It concluded that the violation of Article 1102, in essence, also
established a violation of Article 1105. See supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
As to some of its findings, the award was formed only by a majority.
289.
This segment of my article builds in part upon Coe, supra note 8.
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C. Positive Attributes

A number of laudable by-products no doubt flow from the
NAFTA Parties' decision to submit post-award operations to the
prevailing framework for international commercial arbitration. The
New York Convention, time-honored and widely in effect, has been
generally successful in promoting global enforcement of arbitral
awards. 29 1 It is part of a dual and potentially duplicative system of
control that balances finality concerns with a recognized need for
safeguards. The manner in which courts have manipulated that
balance, however, has often elevated finality as the norm, not the
exception.
The scrutiny entrusted to courts at the place of arbitration,
effectuated by open court proceedings, adds an element of
transparency to a process which has sometimes attracted scorn for its
private aspects. Similarly, some-including the disputants-may
assign added legitimacy to the Chapter 11 process by virtue of a
court's independence and adherence to a system of precedent, as
opposed to what may be perceived (though wrongly) as an arbitral
tribunal's tendency to ignore the law in favor of compromise. These
elements of process supervision may also add a sense of rigor to offset
the perception that international law is largely indeterminate. Even
when set aside is not pursued, the mere fact that such a mechanism
was available may comfort those concerned with the possibility of
292
unrestrained tribunals.
D. Negative Traits and PotentialFlaws
1. Incursions into the Merits.
The arbitration laws of leading arbitral locales within NAFTA
territories exhibit a uniform core in part because Mexico and Canada
have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law. 293 The Model Law in turn
shares with Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) a limited
number of statutory grounds for vacatur concerned mainly with
jurisdictional questions and procedural fairness. Neither the FAA nor

290.
See id. at 188-91.
291.
See Coe, supra note 43, at 144-46; Albert Jan van den Berg, Refusals of
Enforcement under the New York Convention of 1958-The Unfortunate Few, in ICC
ARB. NEXT DECADE 75 (1999).

292.

See generally William W. Park, Why Courts Review Arbitral Awards, in

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
LIBER AMICORUM KARL HEINZ BOCHSTIEGEL 595 (2001).

293.
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted
June 21, 1985, available at http://www.uncitral.org, reprinted in COE, supra note 28, at
505 [hereinafter Model Law].
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the Model Law expressly authorizes judicial excursions into the
merits of an award. But as the Metalclad decision suggests, even
when limited to questions of arbitral excess, courts may define their
role so broadly as to firmly abut the boundary between merits review
294
and mere consideration of the tribunal's mandate.
Further, at least in the case of the FAA, courts have sometimes
embraced non-statutory grounds for vacatur, such as some variant of
the "manifest disregard" doctrine. 295 The autonomy enjoyed among
circuits moreover has led to variations in the availability of nonstatutory grounds and in the construction of Section 10 in general.

A central theme in Metalclad's argument was that a forfeiture of the right
294.
to operate induced by a combination of an unclear regulatory regime and governmental
assurances is simply unfair. It referred to the opacity in the permitting regime as
among other things, a problem of "transparency," and cited awards in which tribunals
compensated aliens for lost property rights precipitated by confused or impenetrable
regulation. See Owners of the Tattler (U.S. v. U.K.), 6 R.I.A.A. 48 (1920); Marguerite de
Joly de Sabla (U.S. v. Pan.), 6 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 358 (1933). Mexico countered by
arguing that the regime could have been deciphered by normal due diligence and that,
regardless, transparency is not expressly guaranteed to investors under Chapter 11.
In its unanimous award, Metalclad the tribunal explicitly found transparency to be
an obligation that could be enforced by a Chapter 11 claimant, at least in the
circumstance where the investor had made the relevant organs of government aware of
the problem and had received largely informal but reassuring guidance upon which to
proceed. See Metalclad, Award, supra note 41.
Though, ostensibly, a private claimant would not ordinarily be entitled to directly
enforce obligations owed only among the three states inter se, in construing Article
1105, the Metalclad tribunal was informed in part by Mexico's Chapter 18
undertakings and the importance attributed to "transparency" as a "principle" linked to
achieving NAFTA's aims. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102(1). Though explicitly
construing Article 1105, the tribunal cited, without quotation, Article 1802(1), which
requires NAFTA states to promptly publish or otherwise make available to "interested
persons" "laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings of general
application respecting any matter covered by the [NAFTA]" and to do so "in such a
manner as to enable [said] persons ... to become acquainted with them." Id.
While some of the interim steps are left to inference by the award, it is clear that
for the Metalclad tribunal, where the host state had failed to fulfill its Chapter 18
transparency obligations, and failed to mitigate the consequences of that inter-state
breach in its dealings with an investor, that failing may contribute to a "totality of
circumstances" in which fair and equitable treatment had not been practiced. See
generally Coe, supra note 45, at 70-75. Mexico's attack on the award was that the
tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by relying on transparency obligations found outside
242-72 (on
of Chapter 11. Mexico v. Metalclad, Petitioner's Outline of Argument,
file with the author).
Justice Tysoe, though considering a unanimous award, accorded no particular
deference to the tribunal's treaty construction. He adopted in significant part Mexico's
view that the transparency principle had been improperly imported from Chapter 18.
The case well illustrates how a determination on the merits, if difficult for the
reviewing domestic court to reconstruct, may succumb to what is in theory a
jurisdictional analysis. See Coe, supra note 8, at 197-98, 202-03.
295.
See Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 162 F. Supp. 2d 278 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), rev'd, 2002 WL 1978908 (2d Cir. 2002); see generally Hans Smit, Is Manifest
Disregard of the Law or the Evidence or Both a Ground for Vacatur of an Arbitral
Award?, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 341 (1997).
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Added to these potentially outcome-affecting differences may be
genuine questions about the FAA's applicability to NAFTA awards
and potential confusion in applicable law engendered by an attacking
29 6
party's apparent choice of U.S. courts in some settings.
2. Systemic Variations
The place of arbitration, and hence the courts that will process
set-aside motions, may affect numerous other elements conceivably
producing for one side a strategic advantage. Among these are:
practice of law restrictions (and the corresponding need for local
counsel), rules governing third party intervention and amicus
filings, 2 97 the availability of appeal, the speed with which the docket
advances, the ability to avoid certain judges, policies concerning
cameras in the courtroom, rules as to costs, and the relative expertise
of the local bench and bar in the law of international investment,
treaties and commercial arbitration.
3. Perceptions Regarding Neutrality
Numerous factors in the pre-award mechanisms established
under Chapter 11 promote systemic neutrality and hence, to that
degree, legitimacy. That tribunals have designated seats of
arbitration in the territory of a given respondent state has thus far
not affected the pre-award stages of an arbitration; the courts have
not been called on to intervene in any way and Section B in
combination with the respective rule formulae have formed a
sufficiently comprehensive procedural regime that references to the
lex loci arbitrihave not been common.
In the post-award setting, by contrast, the local arbitration law
and courts do matter. Under the present arrangement, as happened
in Myers, the respondent state will be entitled to bring its set-aside
action in its own courts if the seat of the arbitration is within its
territory. 298 Though judicial independence is doctrinally well
established in each of the NAFTA states, an investor made to defend
its award in the courts of the host state might reasonably speculate

296.
See Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000)
(finding FAA venue provisions permissive and general venue provisions to supplement
FAA); see also Park et al., supra note 254, nn.12-14 and accompanying text (discussing
the effects of Cortez).
297.
See Coe, supra note 8, at 199; Thomas, Reply to Professor Brower, supra
note 9, at 453, 457 n.95.
298.
See generallyMyers, supra note 68.
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about what nuanced pressures have infected the process. At a
299
minimum, appearances suffer.
E. Improving Control Mechanisms: Abstract Characteristics
1. Overarching Importance and Abstract Criteria
The present system of regulating Chapter 11 awards, being
essentially an adoption of the patchwork applicable to private
arbitration, is capable of performing many of the important functions
entrusted to control mechanisms in general.30 0 Though decentralized,
the fora to which attacks and requests to enforce are currently
addressed are the same ones serving international commerce
remarkably well. Nevertheless, many of the arguable weaknesses
surveyed above are fundamental to the overall integrity of Chapter
11, suggesting the need for a more specialized, more elaborate
mechanism. Conceivably, a jurisprudence of increasing coherency
might result from the present architecture, but not elegantly or
rapidly. The eventual introduction of an ICSID option would only be a
partial answer; it may further fracture the jurisprudence of control
and (because it does not contemplate merits review) would share with
the present arrangement an inability to propound a substantive law
of investment. From the forgoing critique of Chapter 11's existing
reliance on domestic courts, it follows that in fashioning an apt
replacement, a number of attributes might be considered. A tentative
list of some of these is introduced in the sections that follow.
2. Anationality and Neutral Composition
A review body detached from municipal court systems, especially
those of the NAFTA states, would not as readily as the present
system arouse questions about neutrality and independence,
assuming that the jurists who serve are predominately nationals of
non-NAFTA states and are otherwise free of disabling connections to
a party or the subject matter. Whether any of these persons should be
party-appointed, ad hoc, for the proceeding in question is among the

299.
Consider the disappointed investor in Loewen. In deciding whether to seek
setting aside of the tribunal's recent award, it confronts, apart from purely juridical
elements, the considerations that the attack would be against the United States, would
be brought in U.S. courts, and would be seeking conceivably a fresh, second opportunity
to arbitrate government responsibility for the defects in a Mississippi state court's
handling of a jury trail, in a setting in which review by the U. S. Supreme Court was
not sought by the claimant. Despite the injustice chronicled by the arbitrators, even
before it consults the pro-finality doctrines of U.S. law, the investor might suspect that
its case is viscerally unappealing.
300.
See Park, supra note 286. See generally W. Michael Riesman, Control

Mechanisms in InternationalDispute Resolution, 2 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 129 (1994).
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subsidiary questions that arise. Confidence may actually be enhanced
if indulging what one authority has referred to as the "deeply
engrained" belief-at least among states-that the ad hoc judge
301
system has merit.
3. Systemic Neutrality
Where a single, unified, transparent procedure and relaxed
licensing requirements are established, no side is advantaged by
familiarity with the indigenous procedural system. Nor would
disputant resources necessarily be allocated to the identification,
education, and retention of competent local counsel; each party could
enjoy continuity of representation and associated efficiencies.30 2 In
particular, in-house counsel might play a considerable role
throughout and the outside lawyer who may have crafted the theory
of the case in arbitration could be retained, obviating the accelerated
learning that often accompanies instruction of local counsel.
4. Centralization and Standardization
The potential for disparate standards and variegated results
inherent in the present configuration would abate if control powers
were vested exclusively in a single organ, enjoying appreciable
continuity in staffing, and applying a single standard to requests for
set aside. The same body would assess requests to confirm and
petitions to set aside Chapter 11 awards. Of course, if the award, once
confirmed, or set aside, would revert to the New York Convention
system, a measure of disunity would persist as courts addressed could
30 3
rely on local constructions of the Convention.

301.

ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, ASPECTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL

JUSTICE 79 (1991). Similar perceptions have perpetuated the party-appointed
arbitrator model prevailing in international commercial arbitration. No reason appears
why some form of disputants' participation in the reviewing body's composition is not
capable of being manageably accommodated without detracting from its skill and
independence. Much will depend, however, on the size of the chamber that becomes the
standard. If only three panelists serve, it may be preferable to limit disputant input to
collaboration in appointing the chair from a designated list of body members.
302.
See Coe, supra note 8, at 199 n.96.
303.
This would be less so if post-review awards qualified for ICSID Convention
treatment. A related question is whether ICSID awards would be subject to review by
the entity under consideration here, in lieu of the ICSID Convention annulment
procedure currently available. One approach is to let the moving party elect one or the
other annulment procedure, but not both, when the award is issued under the
Convention. Such variations on the ICSID model might well require treaty
undertakings supplemental to the ICSID Convention.
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5. Predictable, Manifold Expertise
At present, the judicial expertise applied in a first instance set
aside action depends to an intolerable degree on the vagaries of
domestic court calendars. 30 4 This concern would not attach to an
appellate mechanism in which all appointed to serve possess depth in
international law and arbitration doctrine. Moreover, in contrast to
the single judge panel typifying trial level courts, if three or more
jurists invariably formed the reviewing panel, the risk of oversight or
outright misadventure would be reduced.
F. Standardsfor Set-Aside
1. Substantive Review
Reasonable minds can differ as to whether the body envisioned
here should be empowered to search for errors of law or to otherwise
consider the merits. A full de novo procedure reaching even the
tribunal's factual findings would be an extraordinary mandate
destined to produce protracted disputes in defiance of NAFTA's stated
goal of establishing fair and effective dispute resolution
mechanisms.3 0 5 Occupying the other pole might be a mandate built
upon the exclusive criteria of the Model Law (which in turn are
30 6
chiefly derived from the New York Convention's refusal grounds).
A middle ground would require reviewers to accept a tribunal's
factual findings but would allow them to apply the Model Law
grounds augmented by an error of law prong. The latter might be
refined to varying degrees by insisting, for example, that set aside
only occur for "manifest" or "serious" or "fundamental" or "prejudicial"
errors of law.

304.
See Coe, supra note 8, at 202-03 (discussing the problem of "expertise
inversion").
305.
See NAFTA, supranote 1, arts.102(1)(e), 1115.
306.
Cf. Howard M. Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New
InternationalCourt for Resolving Disputes on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards, in
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 109 (Martin Hunter et al.

eds., 1995) (proposing creation of an international court for enforcement and set aside
of arbitration awards); H.E. Judge Stephen M. Schwebel, The Creation and Operation
of an International Court of Arbitral Awards, id. at 115 (discussing treaty
implementation of Judge Holtzmann's proposal).
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2. Substantive Review: Competing Interests
a. The International Commercial Arbitration Model
To extend review only to Model Law-like grounds would have
several virtues. It would be consistent with the overwhelming trend
toward excluding substantive review reflected in the Model Law and
in modern arbitration statutes. By making set-aside theories less
numerous, it would promote finality to a greater degree than
expanded review, reducing the overall cost burden shouldered by the
disputants. A mandate confined to the Model Law grounds would
benefit from the jurisprudence developing in the dozens of Model Law
states and, by analogy, under the New York Convention.
b. Prolonged Indeterminacy
To preclude substantive review would forego one mechanism for
addressing the disunity in NAFTA law somewhat evident in the
awards. An authoritative body enunciating the content of customary
international law30 7 and construing provisions common to many BITs
would produce benefits well beyond NAFTA. Further, the fact that
substantive review is available to correct errant awards might
promote use of sole arbitrator tribunals, thus presumably reducing
30 8
costs and occasionally enhancing speed and simplifying procedure.
G. Advisory and Remedial Powers
If the appellate organ is given substantive review, it would seem
feasible also to allow interim tribunal requests for advisory
interpretations on questions of law. Among the subsidiary questions
raised by this prospect are: would the tribunal alone, or the
disputants also, be allowed to petition for advice? Could the tribunal
advance the arbitration while awaiting the result? Would nondisputant NAFTA parties also be entitled to submit questions
prompted by a given proceeding? Would such references be wholly

307.
For discussions of the role of international law before WTO dispute bodies,
see generally James Cameron and Kevin R. Gray, Principles of International Law in
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 248 (2001); Joost Pauwelyn,
The Role of Public InternationalLaw in the WTO: How Far Can We Go, 95 AM. J. INT'L
L. 535 (2001).
My premise is that disputants opt for the more costly three-arbitrator
308.
tribunals in light of the finality of awards and prospect that a single arbitrator, if
misapprehending governing law, can do lasting harm.
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discretionary on the part of tribunals, or would an obligation be
triggered by e.g., a joint disputant request?
A second cluster of questions relate to the remedial powers an
appellate body should have. The forfeiture and inefficiency that
vacatur brings argues for powers of remission, such as those found in
Article 34 of the Model Law. 30 9 Absent fundamental problems of
tribunal jurisdiction or independence, it will often be the most
efficient avenue for the reviewers to identify a concern and to remit it
to the tribunal to "resume the arbitral proceeding or to take such
other action as in the arbitral tribunal's opinion will eliminate the
grounds for setting aside. '3 10 Little harm would be done by also
granting an incidental power to correct clerical errors, though this
might be predicated on the petitioner having exhausted procedures
for correction under the governing rules.
H. Completing ICSID Participation
Upon ratification of the ICSID Convention by Mexico and
Canada, a number of the problems associated with domestic court
review of Chapter 11 awards would evaporate, at least in cases in
which ICSID arbitration is chosen. Where the claim was properly
brought under the ICSID Convention, attacks on the ultimate award
would be processed by ICSID's internal annulment machinery and
not by domestic courts at the arbitration's designated seat. 311
Because the place (seat) of arbitration would lose its meaning for
control purposes, the perceived variations to be found among
domestic venues would be largely irrelevant, unless the claimant had
chosen the UNCITRAL option. The standard procedural debates
about the location of hearing and other meetings could focus on the
balance of conveniences, uncomplicated by asserted deficiencies in
one potential lex arbitri in comparison to another. In many instances,
such debates would be far less contentious than when place serves its
usual function of supplying trail judges, and providing grounds for
vacatur, rules for intervention, standards for appeal, and guidelines
312
concerning costs.
Full ICSID participation, of course, would not fully eliminate
domestic court involvement in the Chapter 11 process. First, domestic
courts may be requested to recognize and enforce ICSID awards, and
to that extent domestic machinery may be invoked upon occasion.
Claimants, moreover, would retain the right to bring their claims as
UNCITRAL Rules proceedings, in lieu of ICSID arbitration. 313

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See
Id.
See
See
See

Model Law, supra note 293, art. 34(4).
supra notes 8, 12-13 and accompanying text.
supra notes 30, 135-39, 288-302 and accompanying text.
NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1120; supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, assuming the UNCITRAL option retains its
popularity, the Chapter 11 docket will produce some awards governed
by a domestic lex arbitri (with its manifold bases for attack) and
others-ICSID Convention awards-subject only to such rules of
sovereign immunity from execution as may apply at the place of
domestic courts could not properly
enforcement. 314 In the latter case,
3 15
entertain a vacatur proceeding.
described-though
still
The
two-track
docket
just
decentralized-seems more satisfying than the present regime
because claimants are provided a meaningful alternative to domestic
courts and the potential for post-award trial court maneuvering
would be retained by choice. Any inefficiencies befalling respondent
states in having two somewhat different domains in which to attack
and defend are the natural result of inducements purposefully
extended to investors.
I. Standing Appellate Bodies
1. ICJ Chamber
Putting aside obvious problems of jurisdiction ratione personae,
an ICJ Chamber established to review investment awards would have
several apparent virtues. In addition to meeting the criterion of
centralization, the court is a standing body with continuity of
membership. 316 No new appointment process would be necessary,
except as may be required to form the chamber. The court's members
are independent, and possess, ex hypothesi, considerable public
international law expertise. Even if merits review were excluded from
the appellate mandate, the oft-raised cluster of questions regarding
excess of mandate will typically be a function of treaty interpretation.
Though the NAFTA docket alone might not warrant founding a
new chamber, the inauguration of the FTAA should present ample
reason for the effort. Indeed, there is no apparent reason why the
317
chamber could not be open to investment awards in general,

314.
See ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 55.
315.
Id. art. 54(1).
316.
See MERRILLS, supra note 160, at 140-45 (discussing ICJ Chambers).
317.
The ICJ statute, art. 26 already authorizes formation of chambers, both ad
hoc (for the particular case) and standing (such as for environmental disputes). See
Collier & Lowe, supra note 160, at 127-29. The success of a chamber dedicated to
investment award review would naturally depend heavily on chamber composition,
especially if that review is to include consideration of the merits. Cf Highnet, supra
note 165, at 41 (business expertise); and see Phoebe N. Okowa, Environmental Dispute
Settlement: Some Reflections on Recent Developments, in REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 157, 168 (Malcom Evans ed. 1998) (expressing doubts about level of subject matter
expertise of ICJ's environmental disputes chamber).
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provided the requisite change in the ICJ Statute-to accommodate
mixed disputes-could be accomplished.
2. The PCA Variation
The jurisdictional limitations complicating the ICJ Chamber
concept might be avoided by inaugurating the appellate chamber
under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),
whose initiatives in recent years have included adopting procedures
318
for mixed arbitration based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
Certain currently-serving and retired ICJ judges, among other
jurists, could be designated to serve as chambers of three or five. The
common Peace Palace location of the PCA and ICJ would facilitate
efficient dual service by the chamber's jurists. The two bodies'
institutional know-how could be combined, presumably making for
fewer administrative questions of first impression.
J. The Merits of a Standing FirstInstance Tribunal
It might be supposed that the same attributes that recommend a
standing appellate body for Chapter 11 awards argue for replacing
non-permanent tribunals completely. That is, why not submit all
alleged breaches of the NAFTA-and perhaps the FTAA-to a
standing adjudicative organ that could develop a uniform law of
investment, benefited by institutional memory, synergism among
tribunal members and similar properties? Despite a certain
attractiveness, several points might be made in opposition to this
idea.
First, the parties' power to select arbitrators to fit the dispute in
question promotes legitimacy by enabling a match between factfinders and the subject matter in dispute. One can foresee for
example a setting which a tribunal chair fluent in French, or versed
in the usages of petroleum concessions, might be deemed by both
parties indispensable to a correct understanding of key testimony and
documentation. Second, being able to submit disputes to a relatively

318.
See Jeffrey Bleich, A New Direction for the PCA: The Work of the Expert
Group, in THE FLAME REKINDLED 17, 41 (Sam Muller & Wim Mijs eds. 1994) (observing
that the PCA can do more to address need for state/non-state disputes); see also Tjaco
T. Van den Hout, Introduction, in INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF MASS
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS VII (PCA ed., 2000) (mentioning desire that PCA be
utilized more fully); ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 58 (3d ed. 1999) (finding much to commend

PCA arbitration); cf. PCA Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two
Parties of Which Only One Is a State, reprinted in COE, supra note 28, at 729.
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unlimited roster of qualified persons-the present model-allows
319
many cases to advance apace simultaneously.

V. CONCLUSION

NAFTA Chapter 11 remains in its infancy and full of promise.
Those accustomed to mixed arbitration find Chapter 1l's innovations
to be mildly sensational, not revolutionary. The first ten years have
witnessed sufficient tinkering with the process through available
mechanisms that many of the attacks launched during Chapter l's
most fledgling operations should by now have lost much of their
energy.
While Chapter 11 maintains formal and informal mechanisms
that exert a unifying influence on substance and procedure, there is
reason to hold that an appellate mechanism of some kind would be
beneficial. Despite what some observers might hope for, the objective
of such a body would not be to rectify international law by consulting
a domestic law more familiar and comforting to the populous at large.
Rather, it should be to create unity of expectations in those that
invoke Chapter 1l's disputes machinery, and if properly authorized,
to enunciate a substantive jurisprudence coherent enough to facilitate
business and governmental planning and to aid in the development of
a general law of foreign direct investment. Regardless, the
increasingly topical appellate body notion, not original to this
essay, 320 poses numerous questions that require further study. Some
of these have been introduced above, but a comprehensive treatment
of the subject will require a far more rigorous examination than has
been possible in this tour d' horizon.
Still, some of Chapter l1's features remain untested, such as
that potentially available to accommodate multiple claims. 32 1 The
latter should be of particular interest when the amounts in

319.
A two-tiered format in which the first instance is essentially the present
Chapter 11 system retrains for the disputants the option to agree to cut costs by having
only one arbitrator in the first instance, which they might be willing to do because of
the safeguard of an appellate level. A first instance standing tribunal could of course
build that option in as well, perhaps making that the norm for disputes below a certain
amount in controversy.
320.
See Dodge, Metalclad Note, supra note 57, at 918 (appellate body could be
given power to correct errors of law); Coe, supra note 8, at 206-07; cf. Frederick Abbott,
The Political Economy of NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the Law and the
Boundaries of North American Integration, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303,
309 (1999) ("preferable that due process challenges be referred to ... commission of
Supreme Court Justices").
321.
See NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1126 (Consolidation).
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controversy are relatively low, 322 and the need for more streamlined
procedures great.3 23 Too, there is the prospect that ICSID Convention
arbitration will eventually become available, bringing with it new
intersections among regimes, new choices, and new challenges.

322.
See, e.g., Evicted, CAL. LAW. 34 (Aug. 2001) (discussing Punta Banda
dispute, Adams v. Mexico, a pending-but not quickly advancing-Chapter 11
arbitration involving multiple landowner claimants).
323.
Cf. Guidelines for ArbitratingSmall Claims under the ICC Rules, 14(1) ICC
CT. ARB. BULL. (2003) (relating task force guidelines addressing special considerations
affecting smaller claims; specific to ICC Rules).
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TABLES
Table 1: Seats (Places) of Arbitration

Respondent Claimant

(Places)
Claimant' Seats
Arbitration
R

of
Rules

Ethyl

USA

Toronto

UN

Canada

Pope & Talbot

USA

Montreal

UN

Canada

S.D Myers

USA

Toronto

UN

Canada

UPS

USA

Washington, DC

UN

Mexico

Azinian

USA

Toronto

AF

Mexico
Mexico

Metalclad
Waste Management (I)

USA
USA

Vancouver, BC
Washington, DC

AF
AF

Mexico

Waste Management (II) USA

Washington, DC

AF

Mexico

Feldman

USA

Ottawa

AF

Mexico

Fireman's Fund

USA

Toronto

AF

Mexico

Gami Inv.

USA

Vancouver, BC

UN

USA

ADF

Canada

Washington, DC

AF

USA

Loewen

Canada*

Washington, DC

AF

Methanex

Canada

Washington, DC

UN

Washington, DC

1AF

Canada

USA
USA

Mondev

Canada

AF = Additional Facility
UN = UNCITRAL

* The nationality of the corporate claimant is Loewen changed during
the arbitration, leading to dismissal on jurisdicitional grounds.
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Table 2: Duration of Arbitration (from Article 1119 Notice to
liability or dispositive determination)
Notice of
Respondent

Claimant

Intent

Decision

Duration

Canada

Pope & Talbot i

12/14/1998

4/10/2001

2 years 4 months

Canada

S.D. Myers i i

7/22/1998

11/13/2000

2 years 4 months

Mexico

Aziman

12/10/1996

11/1/1999

3 years 1month

Mexico

Metalclad"'

10/2/1996

8/22/2000

3 years 11 months

Mexico

Waste Management (I) 9/29/1998

6/2/2000

1 year 9 months

Mexico

Feldman

4/30/1999

12/16/2002

3 years 8 months

USA

ADF

3/1/2000

1/9/2003

2 years 10 months

SA

Loewen

1/29/1998

16/26/2003

5 years 5 months

SA

Mondev

5/6/1999

10/11/2002

3 years 5 months

i.
Award on damages given May 31, 2002.
ii. Award on damages given October 21, 2002. The award was
subjected to set aside proceedings.
iii. The award was subjected to set aside proceedings. The parties
settled on October 30, 2001.
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Table 3: Arbitrators

Case

Arbitrators

Nationality

Position

Germany

Chairman

US

Arbitrator

Mr. Marc LaLonde

Canada

Arbitrator

Hon. Lord Dervaird

Scotland

Dr. Karl-Heinz Bdckstiegel
Mr. Charles N. Brower
Ethyl

Changes (if
any)

Presiding
Arbitrator

Hon. Benjamin J. Greenberg Q.C.
Pope & Talbot

S.D. Myers

Canada

Arbitrator

US

Arbitrator

Brian P. Schwartz

Canada

Arbitrator

Edward C.
Chiasson was

Edward C. Chiasson, Q.C.

Canada

Arbitrator

J. Martin Hunter

England

Arbitrator

appointed
June 24,
1999
following the
resignation
of Mr. Bob
Rae (Canada)

US

Arbitrator

Canada

Arbitrator

New Zealand

President

US

Arbitrator

Mr. Claus von Wobeser Hoepfner

Mexico

Arbitrator

Mr. Jan Paulsson

France

President

Prof. Konstantinos D. Kerameus

Greece

President

Mr. Jorge Covarrubias Bravo

Mexico

Arbitrator

US

Arbitrator

England

President

US

Arbitrator

Mexico

Arbitrator

Mr. Murray J. Belman

Dean Ronald A. Cass
L. Yves Fortier C.C., Q.C.
UPS

Justice Kenneth Keith
Mr. Benjamin R. Civiletti

Azinian

Feldman

Prof. David A. Gantz
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, CBE, Q.C.
Mr. Benjamin R. Civiletti

Metalclad

Mr. Jos6 Luis Siqueiros
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Netherlands

Presiding
Arbitrator

Prof. Thomas W. Walde

Scotland

Arbitrator

Jos6 Agustin Portal Ariosa

Mexico

Arbitrator

US

Arbitrator

Mr. Eduardo Siqueiros T.

Mexico

Arbitrator

Mr. Bernardo M. Cremades

Spain

President

US

Arbitrator

Mexico

Arbitrator

Australia

President

USA

Arbitratro

Mexico

Arbitrator

Netherlands

President

Uruguay

Arbitrator

USA

Arbitrator

France

President

Australia

President

US

Arbitrator

England

Arbitrator

Prof. Dr. Albert Jan van den Berg

Thunderbird

[VOL. 36:1381

Mr. Keith Highet

Waste
Management (I)
Mr. Benjamin R. Civiletti
Mr. Eduardo Magall6n G6mez

Prof. James Crawford, SC, FBA
Waste
Management

(II)

Francesco Carrillo Gamboa
Prof. Dr. Albert Jan van der Berg
Mr. Julio Lacarte Mur6
Prof. Michael Reisman
Gami Inv.

Mr. Jan. Paulsson
Sir Anthony Mason
Judge Abner J. Mikva

Lord Mustill
Loewen

Mr. Eduardo
Magalldn
Gdmez was
appointed
following the
resignation
of Mr.
Guillermo
Aguilar
Alvarez

_(Mexico).

Professor Andreas Lowenfeld

Fireman's Fund

Mr. Eduardo
Siqueiros
was
appointed
January 4,
2000
following the
resignation
of Mr. Julio
C. Trevifio
Azcue
(Mexico).

Lord Mustill
was
appointed
September
14, 2001
following the
resignation
of Mr. Yves
Fortier
(Canada).
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William Rowley, Q.C.

Canada

Arbitrator

Prof. Michael Reisman

US

Arbitrator

Van Vechten Veeder, Q.C.

England

President

Sir Ninian Stephen

Australia

President

Prof. James Crawford

Australia

Arbitrator

US

Arbitrator

Methanex

Mondev

Judge Stephen M. Schwebel

Prof. Michael
Reisman was
appointed
following the
resignation
of Warren
Christopher
on
Septemeber
20, 2002.

Table 4: Outcomes

Case

Outcome

Claimed

Recovered

Costs Awarded

Ethyl

Settled*

US $201 million

$13 million

Partial (in award on
jurisdiction)

Pope & Talbot

Recovery

US $30 million

US $461,566

Partial arbitration costs:
US $120,200

S.D. Myers

Recovery

US $20 million

CAN $6,050,000

Arbitration costs: CAN
$350,000 + Legal
Rp ,,
i, c',qtq.

UPS

pending

US $100 million

pending

n/a

Azinian

Loss for
Claimant

US $11.6 - $19.2
million

no

no

Feldman

Recovery

$475 million
pesos (US $50
millinn

$16,961,055.97 MEX
PESOS

no

Metalclad

Recovery**

US $90 million

$16,685,000

no

pending

US $100 million

pending

n/a

dismissed

US $60 million

no

Claimant to pay
arbitration costs

Thunderbird
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Management (I)

1460

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

Waste
Management (I)

[VOL. 36:1381

the
(resubmitted)

_

-nfling

.

unavailable

pending

n/a

ADF

Loss for
Claimant

US $90 million

no

no

Loewen

Loss for
Claimant

US $725 million

no

no

Methanex

pending

US $970 million

pending

n/a

Mondev

Loss for
Claimant

US $50 million

no

no

* Award on jurisdiction 28 June 1998; settlement followed.
** Award was subjected to set-aside proceedings. Metalclad settled October 30, 2001.

